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ABSTRACT
This article analyses the proposal for reforming the Brazilian patent system pending
before the Brazilian Parliament as Bill No. 5402/13. The proposed legislation
addresses such issues as the assumed insufficiency of the inventive step requirement
in preventing unjustified “monopolies,” the proliferation of so-called secondary
patents, and the extension of market exclusivity positions through strategic filings,
which are being debated also in Europe and the U.S. The proposed legislation offers
an example for possible actions in these critical areas of the patent system. In doing
so, it puts forward options that depart from consolidated Western normative
patterns. In analyzing the reform attempt, this article pursues two purposes. First,
starting from the provisions of the Bill, it explores the flexibilities that WTO
members enjoy under the TRIPS Agreement in designing rules and procedures in
their patent acts. Second, it examines whether the changes proposed by Bill No.
5402/13 are consistent with its proclaimed goals, such as the aim to reserve patent
protection only to “genuine innovations,” to hamper so-called “evergreening” practices
by pharmaceutical applicants, and to foster incremental innovations by domestic
actors. Specific attention is given in this regard to the proposals to introduce: (i) as
separate criteria for patentability a “significant technical advance” in all
technological fields and an “enhanced efficacy” in the chemical sector; (ii) a general
prohibition of use patents; and (iii) a pre-grant and post-grant opposition system.
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FLEXIBILITIES UNDER TRIPS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSAL FOR
REFORMING BRAZILIAN PATENT LAW
ROBERTO ROMANDINI*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2013, the Center for Strategic Studies and Debates of the Brazilian
Parliament published a report (“Report”) on the national patent system. 1 One of the
primary outcomes of the Report was a proposal to reform some features of the
Brazilian Industrial Property Act2 (Law No. 9279/96), which relates to patents and
utility models.3 A bill to that effect is pending in the Brazilian Chamber under the
number H.R. 5402/2013 (Bill No. 5402/13).4
The purpose of this paper is to assess whether or not the provisions of
Bill No. 5402/13 comply with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”).5 While this article does not intend to question
the policy at the basis of attempts at reform, it will address the consistency between
avowed purposes and the selected means in the framework of the TRIPS provisions.6
* © Roberto Romandini 2016. Dr. juris, LL.M. (Munich), Senior Research Fellow at Max Planck
Institute for Innovation and Competition. I am grateful to Professor Denis Borges Barbosa,
Professor Rudolph Krasser and Professor Reto Hilty for useful comments on an earlier draft of this
paper. Further, I want to thank Guilherme Toshihiro Takeishi, Fernando Braune, Gustavo Fróes,
Filipe Fishmann and Augusto Cesar Barbosa de Souza for sharing insights and information on the
court system and the litigation practice in Brazil. Of course, mistakes and inaccuracies are my own
responsibility.
1 Ctr.
for Strategic Stud. & Debates, Brazil’s Patent Reform—Innovation Towards
Competitiveness, Estudios Estrategicos 1 (Braz. 2013).
2 Ley No. 9279, de 14 de Maio de 1996, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 15.5.1996, Seção
1, p. 8353 [hereinafter Law No. 9279/96]. The quotes from the provision of the Law No. 9279/96
contained in this article are taken from the translation available on the WIPO website, at
www.wipo.org.
3 Ctr. for Strategic Stud. & Debates, supra note 1.
4 See H.R. 5402 (Braz. 2013) [hereinafter Bill No. 5402/13]. The quotes of the articles of the Bill
No. 5402/13 contained in this article are taken from the English translation of the Bill in Annex 4 of
the Report, see Ctr. for Strategic Stud. & Debates, supra note 1, at 112.
5 1869 UNTS 299; 33 ILM 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. The TRIPS Agreement
was adopted in Marrakesh (Morocco) on April 15 1995, and is included as Annex 1C in the
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. The Treaty came into force on
January 1, 2015, but provides for a period of transition for developing Members which expired on
January 1 and one for less developed WTO Members which expired on January 1, 2006, which is
extendable upon request. In the specific field of patents, the TRIPS Agreement further provides
developing countries the option to delay the application of provisions on product patents of Section 5
of Part II for an additional period of five years. On the implications of the TRIPS Agreement for the
specific field of patents, see Joseph Straus, Implications of the Trips Agreement in the Field of Patent
Law, FROM GATT TO TRIPS—THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 160, 178 et seq. (ICC Studies Vol. 18, Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker
eds., 1996).
6 On the flexibilities provided by the TRIPS Agreement as the substantive provisions on
patents, see Max Planck Inst. for Innovation & Competition, Declaration on Patent Protection—
Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS, 45 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 679 (2014)
(with commentary by Matthias Lamping).
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There are several reasons why the proposal for reform deserves such an
analysis.
First, the Bill addresses issues such as the assumed insufficiency of the
inventive step as a “qualitative” requirement in preventing unjustified monopolies,
the proliferation of so-called secondary patents, and “evergreening” practices, all of
which are reason for concern in both Europe and the U.S.7 The proposed legislation
offers an example for possible actions in these critical areas of the patent system. In
doing so it puts forward options that depart from consolidated Western normative
patterns. A clarification concerning TRIPS compliance of the measures proposed, as
well as their practical implications, should prove insightful. If the outcome of the
TRIPS analysis is positive for the reform, this would broaden the set of known
legislative tools at the disposal of WTO members for pursuing their own innovation
policy. If not, the study could at least show the way for possible adjustments to
reduce the prospect of a WTO violation complaint. This seems valuable in a context
where several countries are considering reforming their national patent laws 8 or
fusing them into a transnational patent system.9
Second, Brazil is a significant jurisdiction in the field of intellectual property.
On the one hand, it has a long tradition of providing legal protection for technical
innovations. As a founding member of the Paris Union for the Protection of
Industrial Property, the South American republic adopted its first patent legislation
as early as 1804, long before the majority of Western countries. 10 Additionally, Brazil
became a Contracting State of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) in 1978, and a
Member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994.11 By implementing the
TRIPS Agreement, the Brazilian legislature adopted provisions that likely went
beyond the WTO obligations. Even though, within the WTO system, Brazil has been
critical towards the Western patent system, this stance has never translated into
legislative measures. With a few exceptions, domestic law has followed the European
model since 1996.
On the other hand, Brazil is an emerging economic power. As the seventh
largest economy in the world12 with robust industry, though stronger in sectors
where patents do not traditionally play a substantial role, it represents a significant

7 See the literature review by Ove Granstrand & Frank Tietze, IP strategies and policies for and
against evergreening, CIM Working Paper 2014:4, 8 et seq.
8 For a similar initiative on possible reform of the domestic patent law in South Africa, see
Caroline B. Ncube, The Draft National Intellectual Property Policy Proposals for Improving South
Africa's Patent Registration System: A Review, J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 9 (10): 822 et seq. (2014).
9 For initiatives aimed at building a regional patent system in the ASEAN Member States, see
Elizabeth Siew-Kuan Ng, ASEAN IP Harmonization: Striking the Delicate Balance, 25 Pace Int'l L.
Rev. 129 et seq. (2013).
10 See Denis Borges Barbosa, Patents and the Emerging Markets of Latin America—Brazil, in
EMERGING MARKETS AND THE WORLD PATENT ORDER, 135, 135 (Frederick M. Abbott et al. ed.,
2013).
11 On the history of Brazilian Patent System see VIVIANE YUMY MITSUUCHI KUNISAWA, THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION IN BRAZIL—PATENTS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL AREA, 23 et
seq. 87 et seq. (2015).
12 See
IMF,
World
Economic
Outlook
Database
(April
2015)
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/index.htm.
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market for pharmaceutical sales and manufacturing.13 As a result, the country is one
of the main destinations for international applicants. 14
In light of all these factors, a change in the patent policy of the country may
have an impact at the international level. The reform could encourage imitation,
challenge competitors, and affect the content of bilateral as well as regional Free
Trade Agreements. Thus, it is likely to attract more than just academic attention.15
II. OUTLINE OF THE REFORM
The rules contained in Bill No. 5402/13 are not uniform, but do share a common
aim: to make use of alleged TRIPS flexibilities to adapt the current patent regime to
the specific needs of the Brazilian economy.16 The assumption of the reform is that
Brazilian law, which in several aspects goes beyond what is required under TRIPS,
has, thus far, benefited foreign applicants more than domestic players. 17
The changes envisaged relate to both substantive and procedural aspects. As far
as the former are concerned, Bill No. 5402/13 intends to: (1) increase the standard of
inventive step required for granting a valid patent; (2) introduce a rule corresponding
to Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act of 1970; 18 (3) limit the maximum patent term
to 20 years;19 and (4) provide a procedure to declare lawful public, non-commercial
use of patented inventions.
With regard to procedural aspects, the aim of the proposal is to: (1) create a
pre-grant opposition procedure; and (2) strengthen the role of Brazil’s Health Agency,
the Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária (“ANVISA”), in granting proceedings
concerning pharmaceutical inventions.20
13 See
EMIS,
Pharmaceutical
Sector
Brazil,
2
et
seq.
(December
2014),
www.securities.com/emis/sites/default/files/EMIS%20Insight%20%20Brazil%20Pharmaceutical%20S
ector%20Report.pdf. In 2013, the Brazilian pharmaceutical market was already the sixth largest in
the world in terms of revenue ($27.3 bn). See VISIONGAIN Ltd, Brazilian Pharmaceutical Market
Outlook 2015-2025, 2015, https://www.visiongain.com/Report/1400/Brazilian-PharmaceuticalMarket-Outlook-2015-2025.
14 The Instituto Nacional da Propriedade Industrial (INPI) is among the top 10 patent offices
worldwide by number of patent applications filed. Filings by non-residents in Brazil in 2013
amounted to 84.6 % of all applications filed. See WIPO, World Intellectual Property Indicators, 2015,
at 37.
15 The U.S. Biotechnology Industry Organization already requested in 2014 that Brazil be
placed on the Priority Watch List. The organization’s report expressly mentions Bill No. 5402/13 as
a source of concern, since it “represents many of the policy asks of the generic industry and anti-IP
NGO community.”
Biotech. Indus. Org., Special 301 Submission, 21 (2014),
https://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/2014%20BIO%20Submission.pdf.
16 See Ctr. for Strategic Stud. & Debates, supra note 1, at 13 et seq. (arguing that “Brazil should
use its inherent creative ability to adapt and tropicalize its patent system to promote public policies
for innovation in the country”).
17 See id., at 41 et seq.
18 Under the Indian Patent Act of 1970, the following are not considered to be inventions:
(1) “any property or new use of a known substance, or the mere use of a known process, unless such
known process results in a new product”; and (2) “new forms of known substances that do not result
in an improvement in the known efficacy of the substance.” See Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005,
No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005 (India).
19 See Bill No. 5402/13, at Article 2.
20 See id.
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Finally, one additional amendment is intended to clarify the nature and limits of
the protection of undisclosed data in Brazil. 21 This protection is to be conferred only
on the basis of the general rules on unfair competition. Since this article focuses on
the patent provisions, this aspect of the reform will not be addressed further. 22
III. SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS
A. Inventive Step and Technical Advance
1. Legal aspects
According to Article 13 of Law No. 9279/96, “an invention is endowed with
inventive step provided that, to a technician versed in the subject, it is not derived in
an evident or obvious way from the state of the art.”23 The provision is in line with
European standards24 as well as the rules of the Patent Cooperation Treaty
(“PCT”).25
Bill No. 5402/13 aims to amend this article. Pursuant to the proposed new
wording of Article 13 of Law No. 9279/96, an invention involves an inventive step
only when, for a person skilled in the art, “it does not derive in an obvious or evident
manner from the prior art, and provided it represents a significant technical advance
compared with the prior art.” This wording would make the inventive step
dependent upon two cumulative sub-requirements: (1) non-obviousness, as already
provided for under the present law; and (2) technical advance, which has to be
significant to make the invention eligible for protection.26
See id.
On the issue of the TRIPS-compliance of a regime of protection based on unfair competition
rules for undisclosed data, see Max Planck Inst. for Innovation & Competition, supra note 6, at 690;
Christopher Wadlow, Regulatory data protection under TRIPs Article 39(3) and Article 10bis of the
Paris Convention: Is there a doctor in the house?, IPQ, 355 et seq. (2009).
23 For a thorough analysis of this requirement in Brazilian patent law with ample references to
European doctrine and case law, see DENIS BORGES BARBOSA, TRATADO DA PROPRIEDADE
INTELECTUAL—TOMO 2, 1255 et seq. (2010).
24 See Eur. Pat. Convention, Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Article 56
(Oct. 5, 1973,
as
revised
Nov.
29,
2000),
http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legaltexts/html/epc/2013/e/ma1.html [hereinafter EPC]; Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection
of Individuals With Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Article 6 (Strasbourg, Jan 28
1981),
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/108.htm
[hereinafter
Strasbourg
Convention].
25 See EPC, supra note 24, Article 56; WIPO, Regulations Under the Patent Cooperation Treaty,
Rule 33 (July 1, 2014), http://www.wipo.int/ pct/en/texts/rules/rtoc1.htm [hereinafter Regulations
PCT].
26 Technical advance as a sub-requirement for protection is also provided under Indian law.
According to Sec. 2 1 (ja) of the Indian Patent Act "inventive step means a feature of an invention
that involves technical advance as compared to the existing knowledge or having economic
significance or both and that makes the invention not obvious to a person skilled in the art.”
Nevertheless, there are two differences to Article 3 Bill 5402/2013. First, under Indian law technical
advance does need to be significant to make the invention eligible for protection. Second, technical
21
22
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The first commentaries on the rules hold that this amendment is
TRIPS-compliant.27 According to this view, the Member States have leeway to
determine their own standards of patentability. Therefore they may provide the
technical advance as a prerequisite for the validity of a patent and a utility model
without violating international law. However, with respect to patents,28 the
amendment could turn out to be more problematic than expected under the
perspective of the TRIPS Agreement. Whether or not this is the case will depend on
how the concept of “significant technical advance” is understood. At least two
interpretations are possible and have, in fact, been adopted by those jurisdictions
which provided in the past,29 or still provide nowadays,30 for an advance in the art as
a requirement for patentability.
If a technical advance is always considered present when a new solution to
achieve a result is disclosed, regardless of whether or not it works better than
previous means—as has been the German31 and Swiss32 practice in the last century
advance is provided as alternative and not cumulative to the requirement for economic significance.
Therefore, a solution that does not imply a significant technical progress could still be eligible for
protection under Indian patent law. See on the Indian practice Feroz Ali Khader & Srividhya
Ragavan, Proof of Progress: the Role of the Inventive Step/Non-Obviousness Standard in the Indian
Patent Office, PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Ruth L. Okediji & Margo A. Bagley eds., 2014),
572, 583 et seq.
27 See Open Letter from Global Academics in Support of Proposal to Amend Brazil’s Patent Law
to Take Advantage of TRIPS-compliant Flexibilities, (July 10, 2013) available at
http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Expert-Letter-with-Signatures-10072013.pdf; see
also Brief Technical Review of Brazil’s Proposed Patent Law Reforms, available at
http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Brief-Technical-Review-of-BrazilianLegislation.pdf.
28 Utility models are not envisaged and not prohibited by the TRIPS Agreement. The Member
States are free to provide them and define their requirements for protection. See Henning Grosse
Ruse-Khan, The International Legal Framework for the Protection of Utility Models, Max Planck
Inst. for Intell. Prop. & Competition Law Research Paper No. 12-10, at 2 et seq. (Oct. 1, 2012),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/aspac/en/wipo_ip_kul_12/wipo_ip_kul_12_ref_t2b.pdf.
29 In Switzerland and Germany, existence of a technical advance was required by case law, but
not explicitly specified as a prerequisite for patentability by the respective patent acts. For
Switzerland, see ALOIS TROLLER, IMMATERIALGÜTERRECHT 175 (Helbing & Lichtenhahan eds., 2nd
ed. 1959). For Germany, see REBEKKA ÜBLER, DIE SCHUTZWÜRDIGKEIT VON ERFINDUNGEN 85
(Mohr Siebeck Tübingen eds., 2014).
30 See Article 22 of the Patent Law of the People´s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, as amended, effective Oct. 1, 2009). According
to the English translation, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/cn/cn028en.pdf,
“creativity means that, compared with the existing technologies, the invention possesses prominent
substantive features and indicates remarkable advancements.”
The Guidelines for Patent
Examination of the State Intellectual Property Office of the People’s Republic of China, by
commenting on Article 22 of the Patent Law, explain: “Inventive step of an inventions means that,
as compared with the prior art, the invention has prominent substantive features and represents a
notable progress . . . That an invention has prominent substantive features and represents a notable
progress mean, that having regard to the prior art, it is non-obvious to a person skilled in the
art . . . That an invention represents notable progress means that the invention can produce
advantageous technical effect as compared with the prior art . . . .” See State Intellectual Property
Office of the People’s Republic of China, GUIDELINES FOR PATENT EXAMINATION, 2010, available at
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zlsqzn/sczn2010eng.pdf, Part IV, Chapter 4, margin numbers 2, 2.1 and 2.3.
31 See German Federal Supreme Court, Decision of 24 February 1970, Reasons for the decision
no. 3, INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 1970, 258 X ZB 3/69—Anthradipyrazole,
according to which technical advance may exist even if the invention “resides in the fact the
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and as seems to be the Chinese practice 33 today—there is no room for arguing that
this criterion limits the patentability in a way that conflicts with WTO norms.
Indeed, the only cases where the criterion would not be met are when the invention is
already known or does not solve the problem indicated in the patent application. 34
Then, however, either the invention is not new, or the disclosure of the patent
(application) is not enabling. In both scenarios, a rejection of the application would
be justified on the basis of legal grounds, which TRIPS allows. 35
By contrast, if a technical advance is held to exist only when the invention is
superior to the prior art36—an interpretation that would be supported by the
adjective “significant” adopted by Bill No. 5402/1337—then the provision could be
questioned under Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement for the following reasons.
The Treaty exhaustively regulates the criteria for patentability.38 This follows
from the wording of:
(i)Article 27(1) of TRIPS, according to which “patents shall be available for any
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology,
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of
industrial application;”39
technology is furnished not with a better, but with a further “means” for which a need still exists
despite the one or more relevant "means" already known.” See also Ortwin Schulze, Technischer
Fortschritt und Erfindungshöhe—Welche Bedeutung hat der durch die Erfindung erzielte technische
Fortschritt bei der Prüfung auf Erfindungshöhe?, Mitteilungen der deutschen Patentanwälte, 132,
133 et seq. (1976).
32 See Swiss Federal Supreme Court, Decision of 27 January 1912, Entscheidungen des
Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts, 38 II 286 (Switz.), according to which a mechanical device implies
a technical advance if the device works and is industrially applicable, independent of whether the
device concerned is better than devices already used or presents disadvantages compared with them;
see also RICHARD WEIDLICH & EUGEN BLUM, DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE PATENTRECHT 87 (Staemplfi ed.,
1934).
33 According to the Guidelines for Patent Examination of the State Intellectual Property Office
of the People’s Republic of China a notable progress may exist not only when “the invention has
overcome the defects and deficiencies in the existing technology,” but also when it has provided a
new way to solve a specific technical problem. See GUIDELINES FOR PATENT EXAMINATION, supra
note 30, Chapter 4, margin numbers 2-3.
See also YUANSHI BU, PATENTRECHT UND
TECHNOLOGIETRANSFER IN CHINA 21 (C.H. Beck ed., 2010); MATTHIAS STEINMANN, GRUNDZÜGE DES
CHINESISCHEN PATENTRECHTS 121 et seq. (Carl Heymann ed., 1992).
34 With reference to Chinese law, see also Yin Xin-Tian, The Inventive Step Requirement Under
Chinese Patent Law, INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 151, 156 (1989).
35 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, Art. 27 & 29.
36 For such understanding of the requirement in the old German literature and case law, see A.
HAUSDING, DIE ERFODERNISSE EINER PATENTFÄHIGEN ERFINDUNG, 15 et seq. (1900); HANNS
ULLRICH, STANDARDS OF PATENTABILITY FOR EUROPEAN INVENTIONS 13 et seq. (1977).
37 The expression in Portuguese reads as follows: “Um avanço técnico significativo em relação ao
estado da técnica.”
38 See PETER ROTT, PATENTRECHT UND SOZIALPOLITIK UNTER DEM TRIPS-ABKOMMEN 210 et
seq. (2002); E. Richard Gold & Alain Gallochat, The European Biotech Directive: Past as Prologue,
7 EUR. L.J. 331, 359 et seq. (2001); Dorothy Du, Novartis AG v. Union of India: 'Evergreening,'
TRIPs, and 'Enhanced Efficacy' Under Section 3(d), 21 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223, 244 (2014).
39 See NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENTS AND TEST DATA 288 (4th ed.
2014). De Carvalho observes that if Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement allowed substantive
requirements other than novelty, industrial applicability, and inventive step, the Member States
would have chosen a different wording (“provided that at least, they are new, involve an inventive
step, and are capable of industrial application”).
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(ii) Article 70(2) of TRIPS, according to which “the Agreement gives rise to the
obligation in respect of any subject matter existing at the date of
application of the Agreement for the Member in question, and which is
protected in those Member States on said date, or which meets or
subsequently comes to meet the criteria for protection” under the terms of
the Treaty;
(iii) Article 70(8) of TRIPS, according to which the Member States must apply to
patent applications filed under the mailbox system on the date of
application of the Treaty the criteria for patentability “as laid down in this
Agreement as if those criteria were being applied on the date of filing in
that Member.”
The transitional provisions mentioned above—Articles 70(2) and 70(8) of
TRIPS—both seem to exclude the possibility of criteria for protection other than
those listed in Article 27(1) of TRIPS applying to subject matter existing before the
entry in force of the Agreement or to mailbox applications filed after that date.40
The term “patentability” pursuant to Article 70(8)(b) of TRIPS refers to the
ontological features required for a subject matter to be eligible for protection. 41
Technical advance as a condition for grant would be one of these features. Indeed, it
relates to the invention, and not to the patent application or the inventor. Article 27
of TRIPS does not mention a technical advance as being a prerequisite for
protection.42 As a result, if this term in the wording of Bill No. 5402/13 is intended to
imply something different and more than the disclosure of a novel, inventive, and
industrially applicable subject matter, such a rule could be found to be prima facie
inconsistent with Article 27(1) of TRIPS.
A possible argument against this conclusion is that the inventive step is not
defined in the Agreement. For this reason, Member States may allow patenting only
when the claimed invention advances the prior art. However, a WTO challenge could
bring forward three objections against this interpretation of the treaty.
First, the footnote to Article 27 states that the Member States may deem
inventive step to be synonymous with non-obviousness.43 If the national legislature
were free to fill the concept of inventive step with any content, this footnote would be
superfluous.44
Second, Article 31(l)(i) of TRIPS distinguishes between patentable (and thus
inventive) dependent inventions that meet the condition for granting a compulsory
license because they imply an important technical advance of considerable economic
significance, and patentable (and thus also inventive) dependent inventions that do
not meet these criteria. The wording of this provision makes it clear that technical
advance45 and inventive step are not synonymous.46 They represent two different
concepts in the Agreement.47
See id at 288.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, Art. 70(8)(b).
42 See id. at Art. 27.
43 See id.
44 See Straus, supra note 5, at 196.
45 “Avanço técnico” in the Portuguese version of TRIPS; the same expression is used by Bill No.
5402/13.
46 See GIUSEPPE SENA, I DIRITTI SULLE INVENZIONI E SUI MODELLI DI UTILITÀ (133) (Giuffrè ed.,
2011) with reference to the domestic rules of the Italian Law implementing Articles 27 and 31
40
41
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Third, the practice of many WTO-Members consistently differentiates between
technical advance and non-obviousness. The former is regarded as a secondary
indicium for, and not as an intrinsic element of, the inventive step. 48 This distinction
between the two terms is reflected in the PCT Guidelines. 49 Such practice and
understanding are relevant to the construction of Article 27 of TRIPS. 50
Against this background, one might conclude that Member States are free to
clarify the concept of inventive step. However, they are not entitled to subsume
under this term—through legal fictions—additional criteria for patentability which
are not provided for under Article 27(1) of TRIPS. 51 They may not thus deny
protection to an invention which is new, non-obvious, and industrially applicable on
the ground that it is not better than the prior art.
While these considerations would be susceptible to being supported from a legal
point of view, three counterarguments seem more convincing.
First, the footnote to Article 27(1) TRIPS allows the Member States to consider
inventive step synonymous with non-obviousness, but it does not oblige them to do
so.52 Therefore, no exhaustive definition can be inferred therefrom. Also, even if
inventions that are not superior to existing products or processes can be nonobvious,
the Member States nevertheless remain free to apply a stricter definition to the
concept of inventive step.53 They may hold an advance over the prior art to be a
necessary feature of the inventive step required before granting a patent.
Article 27(1) seems to allow this. The semantic content of the expression “inventive
step” covers the requirement for advance.54
TRIPS; see also CHRISTIAN VON KRAACK, TRIPS ODER PATENTSCHUTZ WELTWEIT: ZWANGSLIZENZEN,
ERSCHÖPFUNG, PARALLELIMPORTE 185 (2006); SONIA ELISABETH KOIKKARA, DER PATENTSCHUTZ
UND DAS INSTITUT DER ZWANGSLIZENZ IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION 86 (2010); GESINE BERTHOLD,
EVERGREENING VON ARZNEIMITTELPATENTEN 181 (2011).
47 It might be argued that if inventive step within the meaning of Article 27 consisted of or
incorporated a technical advance, then Article 31(l)(i) would have been given a different wording.
For instance, it would have mandated the granting of a compulsory license only when the
subsequent invention involved a significant inventive step of great economic importance.
48 See AIPPI, Summary Report Question Q217—The patentability criteria of inventive step/nonobviousness
(2011),
at
7,
available
at
http://aippi.org/wpcontent/uploads/committees/217/SR217English.pdf.
49 See MARKUS NOLLF, TRIPS, PCT & GLOBAL PATENT PROCUREMENT 57, note 147 (2001). Nollf
refers to the PCT Preliminary Examination Guidelines, IV-1.3. “The PCT does not require explicitly
or implicitly that a claimed invention must entail some technical progress. Nevertheless,
advantageous effects, if any, with respect to the prior art should be stated in the description, and
any such effects are often important in determining ‘inventive step.’” Id.
50 See
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31.2(b) (1969),
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/ UNTS/ Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf.
51 See NOLLF, supra note 49, at 57.
52 See Janice M. Mueller, J.D., Taking TRIPS to India—Novartis, Patent Law, and Access to
Medicines, 356 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 541, 543 (2007).
53 For a similar conclusion, see also Max Planck Inst. for Innovation & Competition, supra
note 6.
54 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word “step” literally means not only “the act
of putting one leg in front the other,” but also “the distance covered by the step” and the “progress by
stepping or treading.” As a figurative meaning, the Oxford English Dictionary gives “an action or
movement which leads towards a result,” and “a particular move or advance in a course of action.”
The semantic range of the word can thus cover the requirement for a step forward in the technical
development—i.e., for a technical advance. Of course, this is only one of the possible meanings; also
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Second, Article 31(l)(i) of TRIPS defines the conditions for allowing the use of a
patented dependent invention without the authorization of the holder of the
dominant patent.55 Member States violate this rule if a compulsory license is
obtainable, although the invention claimed in the second patent does not imply a
significant advance over the invention protected by the older right. They do not
violate this rule if they define the concept of inventive step in such a way that every
invention, if patentable, automatically would satisfy the requirement for a license
under Article 31(l)(i).56 Furthermore, the requirement under this article incorporates
an economic element (“important technical advance of considerable economic
significance”) which Article 3 of Bill No. 5402/13 does not provide.57
Third, it is true that several Member States distinguish between technical
progress and inventive step, and the PCT Guidelines reflect this fact. Still, these
guidelines represent neither an agreement on the interpretation of TRIPS nor a
“subsequent practice” within the meaning of 31.3(a) and (b) of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties. On the one hand, the PCT does not limit the freedom of the
national legislatures to define their own standards of patentability. 58 On the other
hand, some Member States consider technical advance a condition for the grant. 59
Even if a subsequent practice does not require consistent action from all parties to an

a mere distance from the prior art, a modification of the prior art without improvement or even with
a worsening (a step backwards), would be covered by the term “step” as well. Otherwise, if a step
forward were the only possible meaning of the term inventive step, then the WTO Members were
obliged, and not only allowed, to provide technical progress as a requirement for protection. Indeed
the requirements set up in Article 27 of TRIPS are mandatory. On the use of the Oxford English
Dictionary in the case law of the WTO Panels see Isabelle Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the
WTO Appellate Body, 21 (3) Eur. J. Int. Law 2010: 605, 620.
55 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, Art. 31(l)(i).
56 It might be argued that the only inference to be drawn from Article 31(l)(i) TRIPS is that the
Member States are not obliged to require—in order to grant a valid patent—“an important technical
advance of considerable economic significance” in relation to the invention claimed in the first
patent. Id. Indeed, the wording of the provision presumes the existence of inventions which do not
meet this requirement with respect to a specific older invention but which can nevertheless be
patented. See id.
57 The examination under Article 31(l)(i) TRIPS differs from that would be requested under
Article 3 of Bill No. 5402/13. In the first case, the “important technical advance” has to be assessed
compared with the invention claimed in the older dominant patent. In the case of Article 3 of Bill
No. 5402/13, by contrast, the significant technical advance has to be compared with the entire prior
art. An examination of whether the invention represents a technical advance with respect to the
older invention under Article 31(l)(i) TRIPS may prove problematic. Other than the closest prior art
to be selected under the problem/solution approach of the EPO, the dominant patent might, for
instance, cover an invention which serves a purpose other than that of the later invention or that is
completely neutral for that purpose. Take for instance a procedure for manufacturing a known class
of chemical compounds. If the invention consists of using the manufactured substance as a means of
fertilization, a comparison between the use of the substance and the process for its manufacture—
whether the former represents a technical advance compared with the latter—is difficult. The
invention claimed in the dependent patent—that is a new use for the known substance—does not
aim to improve the invention claimed in the first patent, i.e., the manufacturing process.
58 See also Article 27(5) of the PCT, which states that “[n]othing in this Treaty and the
Regulations is intended to be construed as prescribing anything that would limit the freedom of each
contracting state to prescribe such substantive conditions of patentability as it desires . . . .”
59 See AIPPI, supra note 48, at 7. See also supra notes 26 & 30 for the legal situation in China
and India.
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agreement,60 it is at least questionable whether the (current) European or U.S.
practice on this matter may be regarded as implicitly acknowledged by the other
TRIPS Member States.
If the legacy of the proposed provision were therefore open to opposite
conclusions, a slight change in its wording would reduce the room for challenges
under Article 27(1) of TRIPS without watering down its practical impact. The
proposal could indeed require only a technical advance—and not a significant one—
for granting a valid patent. An explanatory note could clarify that such advance does
not exist merely because another way to solve a technical problem has been disclosed.
In this way, two effects would be achieved.
First, the requirement for a technical advance would perform an eliminatory
function that is not fully coextensive with that of a non-obviousness standard, as the
latter is practiced in Europe61 and the U.S.62 Patent applications for further ways to
solve a known problem, without evidence of an improvement over the prior art, would
fail even if the claimed inventions were not obvious under the law in force.
Second, the deletion of the adjective “significant”63 would leave more scope to
distinguish patentable inventions which are eligible for a compulsory license under
Article 31(l) of TRIPS, from patentable inventions which are not. Since the term
“inventive step” pursuant to Article 27 of TRIPS implies, linguistically, a distance
from the prior art, and this distance, in turn, may also comprise a technical advance,
the chance of a successful attack against the TRIPS compliance of Bill No. 5402/13
would diminish, whilst the possibility of imitation by other legislatures would
increase.
Such a change, however, would have a collateral effect on the intended reform.
According to the new wording proposed by Bill No. 5402/13 for Article 14 of
Law No. 9279/96, a utility model should be patentable “when, for a person skilled in
60 See OLIVER DÖRR, VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY,
ARTICLE 31, 521 et seq. (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds., 2012).
61 According to the EPO, “for an inventive step to be present in claims referring to the
alternative solution of a known problem, it is not necessary to show substantial or gradual
improvement over the prior art.” See T 0620/99, Decision of 8 May 2003, Reasons of Decision no. 30,
unpublished; see also T 0588/93, Decision of 30 January 1996, Reasons for the Decision no. 6.1,
unpublished, according to which “in accordance with the established case law of the Boards of
Appeal, however, when deciding on the question of inventive step in the present case, there is no
need to show an improvement of the claimed adsorbent, whether substantial or gradual, over those
adsorbents described in the prior art.” See also T 0100/90, Decision of 2 April 1991, Reasons for the
Decision no 4.5.1, unpublished; EPO, CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN
PATENT OFFICE, 165 (7th ed., 2013). Alternative solutions to a known problem may be patented, if
not obvious, even if they do not outperform the relevant prior art. Whether or not such cases occur
often is another matter that cannot be investigated here and that would require empirical research
in the case law.
62 See Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., et al., 851 F.2d 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(“The district court held that the Barth stone gave ‘no significant structural advantage . . . over
other pavers,’ and that ‘there is no evidence that the Barth paver makes a stronger or more durable
pavement.’ The patent statute does not require a patentable invention to be superior to all prior
devices.”). See also Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 960 no. 12
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding that whether an invention is an “improvement” is not a prerequisite for
patentability); DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 5.03 [5] [a], 5-310 et seq.; Giles S. Rich,
The Principles of Patentability, 42 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 75 (1960).
63 “Significativo” in Portuguese.
See Bill No. 5402/13, Art. 3. The Portuguese version of
Article 31(l) TRIPS uses by contrast the adjective “importante.”
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the art, it does not derive in a common or vulgar fashion from the prior art, and
provided it represents a technical advance compared with the prior art.” 64
Bill No. 5402/13 intends to differentiate, through a graduation of the technical
advance required, between inventions eligible only for utility model protection on the
one hand, and inventions eligible for both utility model and patent protection on the
other. In this way, it would reduce the scope of patentable inventions, which
proponents of protectionism will see as a good policy. Patents are requested mostly
by foreign companies and utility models by domestic applicants. 65 If the adjective
“significant” were deleted from the proposed Article 13 of Law No. 9279/96, a
criterion for delimiting the sphere of inventions that can be protected through both
patents and utility models from the sphere of inventions that can be protected only
through utility models would therefore vanish.66 Still, the distinction between
patents and utility models does not require limiting patent protection to “significant
technical advance” in the art. Such delimitation can be ensured by giving up a
technical advance or even the inventive step as a validity requirement for utility
models. In this case, in accordance with the principle that the scope of protection
should match the requirement for protection, the scope of protection conferred by the
utility model should be reduced accordingly—for instance, by eliminating any
protection for equivalents.67
At the same time, the legislature should carefully consider the implications of
granting an absolute right under the utility model law for creations which are
obvious within the meaning of the patent provisions. This level of prudence is due at

Bill No. 5402/13 (Braz. 2013) (emphasis added).
See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION [WIPO], WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY INDICATORS, p. 36 (2010).
66 The difference in the current Brazilian law seem to be both a qualitative and a quantitative
one. It is qualitative because it seems that, following the Khölerian conception, the utility model
pursuant to Law No. 9279/96, Art. 9 does not protect a technical teaching, but rather only a concrete
physical tridimensional form; see Denis Borges Barbosa, Proteção dos Modelos de Utilidade e do
Designs (2002), available at denisbarbosa.addr.com/modelos.ppt, p. 3 (“A doutrina enfatiza que o
modelo de utilidade não protege uma idéia, mas uma forma”). But the difference is also quantitative
because the law requires a minor degree of inventive activity. However, the fundamental problem is
that once obviousness is adopted as a requirement of protection, it is doubtful whether this element
can be graduated. Obviousness is considered a qualitative element, and the invention is either
obvious or not. See Paul G. Cole, Inventive Step: Meaning of the EPO Problem and Solution
Approach, and Implications for the United Kingdom: Part 1, 20 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 214, 215
(1998); FRANZOSI, La nozione di modello di utilità, IL DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE, 205 et seq. (1998). For
this reason, the German Federal Supreme Court came to the conclusion that, despite a different
wording of the applicable law, the inventive step required for utility patents may not be
distinguished from the inventive activity requested for patents, and that to allow a protection for
inventions obvious under patent law through utility model would likely conflict with constitutional
principles that protect the economic freedom of the competitors. See German Federal Supreme
Court (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH), 2006 GRUR 842, et al. (June 20, 2006)—Demonstrationsschrank.
The Austrian and the Italian case law came to similar conclusions as the German Federal Supreme
Court. See Rainer Beetz, Zur Erfindungsqualität im Gebrauchsmusterrecht, Österreichische Blätter
für Gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht, 148 et seq. (2007); Roberto Romandini, La
distinzione tra brevetti e modelli di utilità: una diversa interpretazione della disciplina positiva,
RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE, Vol. 60, Nr. 1, 200 et seq. (2011).
67 For such a proposal with respect to German utility model law, see MANFRED BÜHRING ET AL.,
GEBRAUCHSMUSTERGESETZ 153 (8th ed. 2011).
64
65
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least when the limitations of competition deriving from a utility model, though
shorter in time, are no less intensive in effect than those resulting from a patent. 68
If the competition policy considerations underlying the reason for having
obviousness as a condition for granting a patent are considered cogent, a legislature
should refrain from creating, under an alternative regime, equivalent monopoly
rights for technical innovations which are obvious within the meaning of the
applicable patent law.69
2. Practical Aspects
If incorporated into the current law, the requirement for a “significant technical
advance” would raise several issues.
Assuming that a significant technical advance requires the invention to be
superior to the prior art in at least one respect—otherwise the condition would be
superfluous—the other questions relate to:
(i)the method of examination, whether it is permissible to combine the prior art
by assessing the existence of a significant technical advance (as is the case
for an inventive step), or whether it should be prohibited (as is the case for
novelty);70
(ii) the burden of proof and the evidence requested;
(iii) whether the indication of advantageous effects and possibly requested
experimental evidence can be included for the first time in the Brazilian
patent application, even if they were not mentioned in the first foreign
filing, without compromising the right of priority;
(iv) whether such indication of advantageous effects may occur after the filing
date and during the grant proceeding before the National Industrial
Property Institute or Instituto Nacional da Propriedade Industrial (“INPI”),
without violating the prohibition of adding new subject matter to the
original content of the patent application 71 (if this is not the case, the
question becomes whether the applicant may rely on advantages not
mentioned in the application as originally filed, but alleged during the
68 This seems to be true for the Brazilian legislation. Article 41 of Law No. 9279/96 contains
identical wording to Article 69 EPC. See also Article 42(I) of Law No. 9279/96, which implements
Article 28(1)(a) of TRIPS, applying to both utility models and patents. See also BARBOSA, supra note
23, at 1721.
69 For the debate in Germany, see generally RUDOLF KRAßER, Wird der Gebrauchsmusterschutz
noch gebraucht? in SCHUTZ VON KREATIVITÄT UND WETTBEWERB—FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ULRICH
LOEWENHEIM ZUM 75. GEBURTSTAG 157 et seq. (R.M. Hilty et al. eds., 2009).
70 The Chinese practice seems to examine the technical progress of the invention against each
single piece of prior art considered individually, as in the case of novelty, at least as indicated in the
report by Xin-Tian. See Yin Xin-Tian, supra note 34, at 151, 154 et seq. However, the Guidelines of
the Patent Office (SIPO) do not contain in this respect a corresponding instruction for the examiner.
71 See Law No. 9279/96, Art. 32, according to which, in order to improve the patent application,
the applicant “may make changes until the time of the request for examination, provided these are
limited to the subject matter initially disclosed in the application.” According to Article 50(III) of the
Law No. 9279/96 the patent may be revoked when its “object extends beyond the contents of the
application filed originally.”
Similar provisions apply in Europe; see Article 123(2) and
Article 138(1) lit. (c) EPC respectively.
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patent granting proceeding, although they may not be included in the
patent specification); and
(v) finally, whether, during the granting proceeding, the applicant may submit
post-published evidence to support the statement made in the original
application according to which the claimed subject matter has specific
advantages.
It would be advisable to clarify these aspects in guidelines or secondary
legislation rather than leaving them to the case law that will come into play only
several years after the reform takes effect.
3. Policy Considerations
The introduction of a technical advance as an additional requirement in the law
of obviousness could raise some legitimate doubts in the patent community. Modern
patent law has consolidated over the years. The current set of requirements for
protections is the result of long-term experimentation. New grant conditions would
make the operation of the system more complicated. It would also make it more
difficult for the INPI to cooperate with foreign patent offices to tackle the backlog.
Such cooperation requires harmonized conditions for granting a patent.
But the approach also has some arguments in its favor. For years, a part of the
literature has been voicing criticism against presumed insufficiencies of the inventive
step, at least as conceived or practiced in Europe and the U.S. Raising the bar
became a political issue.72 But how to implement these abstract policy desires in
practice was unclear and remains so. The task is fraught with analytical difficulties
deriving from the very nature of the requirement concerned. Inventive step as laid
down in western legal models is a qualitative concept. It places the examiner and the
judge before a strict binary decision: either the invention is obvious (or evident) or it
is not.73 Tertium non datur.74 In European and U.S. case law, the invention is
obvious only when, dispersed in different pieces of the prior art, there is a suggestion
to combine the single features of the invention.75 By this understanding, increasing
the level of the requirement is first a logical problem. Doing it without making the
whole assessment subjective or even arbitrary is a practical challenge still awaiting a
conclusive proposal. Significantly, the attempt to graduate the inventive step in
order to distinguish an invention eligible for both patent and utility model protection
from an invention eligible (only) for utility protection has failed—at least in
continental Europe.76
The idea of creating a new sub-requirement could turn out to be an approach
also worth consideration for a mature jurisdiction.
72 See
Klaus Grabinski/Thomas Adam, Vor Präambel, in BENKARD, Europäisches
Patentübereinkommen, 2. ed 2012, at 50 et seq.
73 Cole, supra note 66, at 215 et seq.
74 William R. Cornish, The Essential Criteria for Patentability of European Inventions: Novelty
and Inventive Step, INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L., 765, 773 (1983); GHIDINI, PROFILI
EVOLUTIVI DEL DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE, 2 ed., 107 (2008).
75 On the could/would approach of the Board of Appeals of the EPO see EPO, supra note 61, at
182 et seq.
76 See discussion supra note 66.
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In this regard, it may be useful to explore the reasons why in Germany—the
main jurisdiction in which a technical advance was requested and examined for grant
of a patent—the relevance of this requirement was gradually lost in the 20th century,
with the result that the German legislature in 1978 finally abandoned it without
significant opposition in the interest of European harmonization. There were three
more recurring objections against such a requirement for protection.
The first objection was that a patent office is ill-equipped to assess a technical
advance. Examiners do not conduct experiments, and therefore cannot really check
whether the invention outperforms the prior art. Furthermore, a solution can
become advantageous after the filing date because of changes in relevant factors,
such as the cost of commodities and energy or the efficiency of collateral technologies
and auxiliary equipment. As a contingent feature of the claimed technology, progress
would prove to be an uncertain element to assess and open to arbitrary judgment. 77
Second, a patent for inventions that advance the prior art can hurt a competitor
more than a patent for an invention that is not better than existing technologies. 78 If
an invention that is not better than the prior art is patented, competitors can resort
to known substitutes without suffering any loss in competitiveness. The exclusivity
right does not really affect them. By contrast, if a solution implying a technical
advance is removed from the public domain, despite being obvious, competition is
affected. As a consequence, consumers and final users are hurt as well.
Third, the existence of the technical advance could induce the examiner to
establish a “reciprocal proportionality” with the inventive step, 79 jeopardizing the role
that the latter performs in the interest of free competition.
However, from a present-day perspective, the perception of these problematic
aspects may have changed and these objections may turn out to be less convincing
than they were in 1978.
The argument that patent offices are not qualified to examine a technical
advance may indeed be valid. However, this has not changed the fact that, in several
technical fields, the alleged advantageous effects of the invention are in any case the
controlling factors over patentability. This is the case, in the chemical field, when a
structural similarity when compared with existing products has been shown by the
examiners, and the effects of the compounds are material for patentability—
something which is true of the vast majority of patent applications for new chemical
substances. Comparative tests are requested, submitted, and examined in the grant
procedure80 without, apparently, any insurmountable practical shortcomings. 81
The contention that patents for a nonobvious equivalent or inferior additional
way of solving a problem are less harmful than patents for an invention that is
77 See Richard Wirth, Schöpfung und Fortschritt als Kriterium der Erfindungshöhe?,
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht [GRUR], 73, 81 et seq. (1923); Fritz Walleser, Das
Leistungsprinzip und der technische Fortschritt, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht
[GRUR] 533, 535 et seq. (1964). See also the historical analysis of the debate by Übler, supra note
29, at 86 with further references; ULLRICH, supra note 36, at 15 et seq.
78 See Walleser, supra note 77, at 535.
79 See id.
80 See EPO, supra note 61, at 231 et seq.
81 For the U.S. practice, see U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE Ch. 2100, § 2142 (9th ed. March 2014) [hereinafter
MPEP].
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obvious, but superior to the prior art, argues against replacing inventive step by
technical advance, but not against combining both as conditions for patenting. The
risk of the resulting coexistence requiring a reverse proportionality is preventable.
For instance, legislative indications or guidelines could clarify that the two
requirements are cumulative.
Third, even the opinion that there is no problem with the grant of patents for
inventions which do not work better than the prior art may be challenged today.
Patenting such inventions can indeed harm competitors if the use of the claimed
subject matter then becomes necessary for heterogeneous, non-technical reasons—
for instance, to comply with a standard.82 Patenting such invention can further
affect competitors when the use of the claimed subject matter becomes advantageous
after the filing date. This could occur, for example, when a second inventor shows a
new use for a patented substance which is by far more useful and relevant than the
uses disclosed in the product patent by the first inventor. 83 Lastly, patenting of
inventions that are not superior to the prior art could deter competition when it is
part of a strategy aimed at creating an artificial barrier to market entry.
Nevertheless, while the standardization issue does not seem to be on the agenda
of the Brazilian Proposal84, and while the question related to new uses of patented
subject matter can be properly handled under inventive activity, 85 the issue of
“evergreening” in the chemical field is addressed by another rule of Bill No. 5402/13
that deserves careful attention.

82 For some standards-essential patents, empirical research has confirmed a higher forward
citation rate, which may imply a technical merit of the protected inventions. However, this does not
hold true for a significant number of these patents. Further, these studies found that the
participation of the patentee to the standard process was “even a stronger determinant for patent
inclusion than the patent’s value.” See Fraunhofer Institute for Communication System, Study on
the Interplay between Standards and Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), Final Report (April 2011),
at 22 et seq, available at http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item
_id=5414&lang=en&title=Study-on-the-Interplay-between-Standards-and-Intellectual-PropertyRights-%28IPR%29, with further references. For an invention to be included in a standard, it is not
required to outperform the alternatives already known at the filing date. The criteria for inclusion
are ultimately based upon the ability of the technical teaching to achieve the standardization aims.
83 Cf. Lorenzo, Advance in the Art: The Essential Criterion of Patentability, 56 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 195, 202 et seq. (1974).
84 For the relevance of the issue in the context of the Brazilian legal order, see Denis Borges
Barbosa, Patents, Technical Standards and Frand License Offerings Under Brazilian Law
(March 11, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2576956 (last visited July 3,
2015).
85 A proper balance between the interest of the inventor of new entities and the inventor of
subsequent uses could be achieved, for instance, by allowing absolute product claims only when the
creation of the compound itself is inventive, or by generally allowing only purpose-bound protection.
Both measures are TRIPS-compliant. See Max Planck Inst. for Innovation & Competition, supra
note 6.
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B. Incorporation of Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act (IPA) into Brazilian Law
1. Premise
According to Article 3 of Bill No. 5402/13, intended to amend Article 10 of Law
No. 9279/96, the following kinds of subject matter are not to be considered
inventions:
i)
any new property or new use of a known substance;
ii) the mere use of a known process, unless this known process results in a
new product; and
iii) new forms of known substances that do not result in an improvement in the
known efficacy of the substance.
The wording of the proposed exclusions follow, with slight variations,
Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act of 2005 (IPA 2005).86
The declared purpose of the legislature for the Indian provision is to reduce
“evergreening” and foster incremental innovation. 87 A similar intention seems to
underlie Bill No. 5402/13.88
The provision refers to items which, in the view of the Bill’s drafters, should not
be considered inventions within the meaning of the Law No. 9279/96. The same
holds true for Section 3(d) of the IPA. However, the dogmatic unity and consistency
of the list is only apparent. Some of the subject matters listed do indeed constitute
an invention in the field of technology, pursuant to Article 27 of TRIPS, and not a
discovery. Further, the exclusions do not share an identical rationale and uniform
content. Both elements matter in a TRIPS compliance analysis.
2. New Properties of a Known Substance
The exclusion of new properties of a known substance from patent protection is
straightforward. Patents are granted under Article 27(1) of TRIPS for inventions “in
all fields of technology.” A technical invention teaches how to solve a problem and
how to use specific means and/or natural forces for this purpose. The disclosure,
therefore, that a material or a substance has specific properties does not describe a
patentable subject matter, but merely conveys abstract information.
This
information may indeed be the basis of a technical teaching. 89 However, the
information, as such, is not patentable. The patent claim may therefore refer only to
86 See Ctr. for Strategic Stud. & Debates, supra note 1, at 112; Patents (Amendment) Act, § 3(d),
2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005 (India).
87 See Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent
System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. OF PITT. L. REV., 491, 550 et seq.
(2007).
88 See Ctr. for Strategic Stud. & Debates, supra note 1, at 112 et seq.; Jae Sundaram, India’s
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Compliant Pharmaceutical Patent Laws: What
Lessons for India and Other Developing Countries?, 23 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L., 2, 81, 111 et seq.
(2014).
89 The exploitation of the properties of the material concerned in order to achieve a result may
consist of an invention eligible for protection under general conditions.
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the teaching on how to use said properties and for which purposes, and not to the
properties of the material as such. Furthermore, the disclosure of properties of a
substance which is already part of the prior art does not make the substance itself
new. At least this is not required by the WTO norms.
Article 3 of Bill No. 5402/13, by excluding from patent protection the new
properties of a known substance, does not, therefore, point to an exception to
patentability. The rule merely specifies negatively the concept of invention, insofar
as it does not raise any TRIPS issues. But the Indian legislature, by enacting Section
3(d) of the IPA, probably wished to achieve more than the mere clarification that
abstract knowledge per se is not eligible for protection or that finding a new property
does not render new a known substance. Similarly, the Brazilian Bill likely intends
to address situations where the patent application discloses a new technical effect of
a known substance with respect to methods of use already described in the prior art.
In this case, it might be argued that, even if the activity claimed is the same as in the
prior art, the new technical effect could be incorporated into the claim as a functional
feature and make the method patentable once again. Such an approach has
sometimes been followed by the European Patent Office (“EPO”).90 However, it is not
required by the WTO provisions. Article 27 of TRIPS does not prohibit considering
the new effect inherently anticipated if the same is necessarily produced by the
already known use of the substance. The provision does not make any limitation for
regulating the content of the prior art and the novelty requirement. Therefore, if the
method steps claimed are not different in any element from those already practiced
in the prior art, the Member States may deny patent protection without violating any
WTO obligation.
If the abovementioned understanding of the exclusion concerned will be
accepted, the norm will close the door to any grants concerning use inventions where
the physical activity claimed has already been described in the prior art, even if the
applicant has discovered a new effect and therefore a new purpose for which such
physical activity may be carried on.91 While such a rule would likely have limited
practical impact even in the European legal system, where use claims are admissible,
its relevance for current Indian law and the prospective Brazilian Act is unclear.
That is because another prong of Section 3(d) of the IPA 2005 and of the
corresponding provision in Bill No. 5402/13 deals, in a more radical way, with all use
claims.

The case law on this matter is not consistent. See EPO, supra note 61, at 141 and 154 et seq.
For instance, the prior art shows that a known compound can be used for increasing the
growth of plants, and a pending patent application discloses that the same known compound can be
used also for preventing fungal infections in plants. In this case, since the way of pursuing the two
effects is the same and consists in spraying the plants with the substance, the activity claimed by
the patent application is identical to that anticipated by the prior art. The only novel feature is the
purpose for which it is performed. Despite that, in Europe, provided that the purpose was not
obvious, the use of the substance for preventing fungal infections in plants could be eligible for
protection; see T 0231/85, Decision of 8 December 1986, OJ EPO 1989, 7—Triazole derivates/BASF,
from which the example is derived.
90
91
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3. New Uses of a Known Substance
The exclusion for new uses of known substances does not clarify the concept of
invention and is not based on the requirement for inventive activity. Indeed, the
subject matter concerned may be a technical invention according to Article 27 of
TRIPS, and is denied patent protection regardless of whether it is novel or inventive.
The provisions therefore enshrine an exception to patentability, preempting
protection for subject matter which would otherwise represent a patentable
invention. However, as far as medical uses of known substances are concerned, the
exclusion is allowed under TRIPS. Under Article 27(3)(a) of TRIPS, Member States
are free to exclude medical methods from patent protection. 92 The use of a substance
for the treatment of a disease is one of these methods. 93
By contrast, insofar as no medical uses are concerned, the provision tests the
limits of Article 27 of TRIPS. It excludes from patentability a category of inventions
even if they are novel and inventive and no exception under Article 27(2) or (3) of
TRIPS applies.
This conclusion is not shared by all authors. According to some scholars, TRIPS
would require that a patent be granted only for processes and products. 94 Methods of
use do not fall under any of these categories. 95 Therefore, they may be excluded from
patent protection without violating the Treaty. 96 This is said to be true even if the
claimed use is novel and inventive. I cannot agree with this opinion for three
reasons.
First, Article 27 of TRIPS mandates patent protection for any invention in the
field of technology, whether product or processes. The wording of the provision
assumes that no invention exists which would not fall into either of these two

92 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, Art. 27(3)(a) (“Members may also exclude from
patentability: diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans and
animals.”).
93 See, with reference to European Patent Law, BENGT DOMEIJ, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS IN
EUROPE 178 (2000).
94 See CARLOS MARÍA CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
274 (2006); Linda L. Lee, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 281, Trials and TRIPS-ulations: Indian Patent Law
and Novartis AG v. Union of India, 281, 281, 307 et seq. (2008); Edson B. Rodrigues Jr. & Brian
Murphy, Brazil's Prior Consent Law: A Dialogue Between Brazil and the United States Over Where
the TRIPS Agreement Currently Sets the Balance Between the Protection of Pharmaceutical Patents
and Access to Medicines, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 423, 430 (2006); see also Commission of the
Andean Community, Decision 486, Common Intellectual Property Regime Art. 21 (Sept. 14, 2000).
95 See CORREA, supra note 94, at 274. This author considered an exclusion of new medical uses
of known substances from patent protection to be TRIPS-compliant also on the basis of Article 27(3)
of TRIPS, according to which the Member States may exclude the patentability of “therapeutic
methods to which second indications claims are essentially equivalent.” Id. However, both
arguments—that medical uses of known substances are not processes within the meaning of Article
27(1) and that they are medical methods within the meaning of Article 27(3)—are contradictory and
may not be pleaded together. Article 27(3) TRIPS refers indeed to methods which are patentable
inventions pursuant to Article 27(1) TRIPS.
96 See CYNTHIA M. HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS ON PATENTS AND RELATED RIGHTS 92 et seq. (2011); CORREA, supra note 94, at 274;
UNCTAD-ICTSD, PROJECT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,
356 et seq. (2005).
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categories. The mention of product and processes therefore does not limit the scope
of the obligation to grant patents for any innovation in the field of technology.
Second, TRIPS uses the word “process” as a genus comprising, as a species,
processes for manufacturing a product and methods for performing an activity. This
follows from Article 34 of TRIPS, which applies only to a “process for obtaining a
product,” and to Article 27(3), which allows methods of treatment to be excluded from
patent protection.97 The latter optional exception would be of no use if methods were
not a (process) invention within the meaning of Article 27(1) of TRIPS.
Third, a claim for “a method for killing insects by administering substance Y”
and a claim for the “use of substance Y for killing insects (or as insecticide)”98
concerns the same activity. Both claims confer, under Article 28(1)(b) of TRIPS,
identical protection.99 Therefore, even if it were successfully argued that a use is not
a method and that Article 27(1) of TRIPS mandates protection for the latter but not
for the former, under no circumstances would a legislature be entitled to prohibit
method claims.
Against this background, if the exclusion concerning use claims did not ban
method claims also aimed at the same activity, it would be irrelevant; if it included
them, it would be at odds with Article 27 of TRIPS, insofar as no medical uses are
involved.100
4. New Forms of Known Substances
a. Legal Aspects
The exclusion for “new forms of known substances that do not result in an
improvement in the known efficacy of the substance” reproduces the wording of
Section 3(d) of the IPA 2005 as well.101 For this provision, Indian law adds an
explanatory note according to which, for the purpose of the exclusion “salts, esters,
ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, size of particles, isomers, mixtures of
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, Art. 34; see id. Art. 27(3).
This example is taken from UK Intellectual Property Office, Examination Guidelines for
Patent Applications Relating to Chemical Inventions in the Intellectual Property Office, p. 16 (Aug
2012) (“It should also be noted that a claim such as ‘the use of substance X as an insecticide’ is
regarded as equivalent to a ‘process’ claim of the form ‘a process of killing insects using substance
X.’”).
99 See G 0005/83, Decision of 5 December 1984, OJ EPO 1984, 64 Reasons for Decision no. 11, —
Second medical indication/Eisai (“The European Patent Convention, in general, allows both method
claims and use claims but whether any activity is claimed as a method of carrying out the activity
(setting out a sequence of steps) or as the use of a thing for a stated purpose (the sequence of steps
being implied), is, in the opinion of the Enlarged Board, a matter of preference. For the European
Patent Office there is no difference of substance.”).
100 Additional inquiries under Article 8 of TRIPS are not necessary, since this article does not
justify exclusions from patent protection not provided under Article 27(2) and (3) TRIPS; see
CHARLES LAWSON, JUSTIN MALBON & MARK DAVISON, THE WTO AGREEMENT ON TRADE: RELATED
ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 236, margin number 8.70, Art. 8
(2014).
101 See Patents (Amendment) Act, § 3(d), 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005 (India).
97
98
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isomers, complexes, combinations and other derivatives of a known substance shall
be considered the same substance, unless they significantly differ in terms of
properties regarding efficacy.”102
This explanatory note raises two issues for the literature. First, it uncritically
adopts the wording of Article 10.2(b), Directive 2004/27/EC, a provision that does not
deal with patentability, but rather with drug-regulation issues.103
Furthermore, its wording is not fully consistent with the rule it intends to
explain.104 For Section (3)(d) of the IPA, a new form is patentable if an improvement
on the known efficacy of the substance is shown. For the explanatory note, such a
new form is to be regarded as the same substance if it does not differ in properties
relating to efficacy. According to Section (3)(d) of the IPA, differences in properties
concerning efficacy are not sufficient and not relevant for patentability. For the
explanatory note, they seem, by contrast, necessary to consider the substance new.
The first provision seems to address which advance over the prior art is required for
new forms of known substances to be patentable. The explanatory note seems, by
contrast, to address novelty. The apparent discrepancy between the two norms was
justified in the Indian literature105 by the haste with which the law was approved.
The Brazilian reform nevertheless intends to incorporate both provisions in domestic
law.
From a systematic viewpoint, the Supreme Court of India has understood
Section 3(d) of the IPA 2005 as an exception to patentability 106 Indeed, in the view of
the Supreme Court, a subject matter—that is an invention and that is novel and
inventive within the meaning of Section 2(1)(j) and (ja) IPA—could nevertheless turn
to be not patentable because of Section 3(d) IPA. Part of the literature considers
Section 3(d) IPA 2005 to be instead a clarification of the inventive step.107 In the
opinion of those authors, the rule wants only to explain how to apply this
requirement to inventions concerning a modified form of known substances. For
TRIPS compliance, it does not matter how the legislature or the courts understand
the domestic rule. What is relevant is only whether the things the provision refers to
fall under the categories of subject matter that may be excluded from patent
protection pursuant to TRIPS provisions. 108
In this respect, three justifications are abstractly possible for the exclusion. One
could indeed argue that “new forms of known substances that do not result in an
Id.
See BERTHOLD, supra note 46, at 176.
104 See BERTHOLD, supra note 46, at 176 et seq. with further references; see also SHEETAL
THAKUR, PATENTING IN INDIA, 317 et seq. (2015).
105 See Shamnad Basheer, India’s Tryst with TRIPS: The Patents (Amendment) Act 2005, 1 IND.
J. OF L. & TECH., 15, 24 et seq. and 43 et seq. (2005).
106 See Novartis AG v. Union of India & Ors., Decision of 1 April 2013, Civil Appeal Nos.
2706-2716, 2728, and 2717-2727, ¶ 192 (India) [hereinafter Novartis Supreme Court Decision],
available at http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40212. See on this judgment
Stefano Barazza, Incremental pharmaceutical innovation in India: the Supreme Court's judgment in
the Novartis Gleevec case, 8 J. OF INTELL. PROP. L. & PRACTICE, 776 et seq. (2013).
107 Rajarshi Sen & Adarsh Ramanujan, Pruning the Evergreen Tree or Tripping Up over
TRIPs?—Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act, 1970, 2 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L.
2010, 170 et seq.; Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS
Implementation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571, 1597 (2009).
108 See BERTHOLD, supra note 46, at 176.
102
103
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improvement in the known efficacy of the substance” either (i) are not inventions
pursuant to Article 27(1) of TRIPS; or (ii) fall under one of the exceptions of Article
27(2) or 27(3) of TRIPS; or (iii) are not inventive within the meaning of Article 27(1)
of TRIPS.
The first argument would be clearly untenable. The wording of TRIPS makes it
clear that chemical or pharmaceutical products can also be the subject of an
invention in the field of technology. This is confirmed inter alia by the transitional
provisions, such as Article 70(8) of TRIPS, which specifically consider pharmaceutical
products as a subject matter eligible for protection within the meaning of
Article 27(1) of TRIPS.109 The new form of a chemical substance may fulfill this
notion. Whether the claimed product is a completely new entity or a derivative from
known compounds has no relevance for the issue of whether or not it constitutes an
invention. Article 27 of TRIPS clearly separates the concept of patent-eligible
invention from the requirements for its protection.110
The second argument would fail as well. According to the predominant view,
Article 27(2) of TRIPS requires the Member States to prohibit the commercial
exploitation of inventions for which no patent might be granted for policy or moral
reasons.111 This would imply that the Indian or Brazilian legislature should prevent
domestic companies from selling substances comprised by Section 3(d) IPA 2005 or
Article 3 of Bill No. 5402/13 in order to successfully invoke Article 27 TRIPS as
justification for patent exclusion, which would likely defeat the very purpose of the
provision. Against this background, Article 27(2) of TRIPS is hardly relevant for
assessing the TRIPS-compliance of the exclusions concerned.
The only way to justify the norm is therefore by referring it to the inventive step
(Article 27(1) TRIPS).112 The rule could be intended as an attempt to clarify when an
inventive step exists and when it does not with respect to chemical compounds for
109 See also Daiichi Sankyo Co. Ltd., et al. v. DEMO Anonimos Viomikhaniki kai Emporiki
Etairia Farmakon, ECJ Case no. C-414/11 (July 18 2013), points 65 et seq., where the ECJ states:
Article 27(1) of the TRIPs Agreement provides that any invention, whether a
product or a process, which is new, involves an inventive step and is capable of
industrial application is patentable, provided only that it belongs to a field of
technology. As regards that condition, it is clear that pharmacology is regarded
by the contracting parties to the TRIPs Agreement as a field of technology within
the meaning of Article 27. That follows in particular . . . from Article 70(8) of the
TRIPs Agreement, a transitional provision dealing with the situation in which ‘a
Member does not make available as of the date of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement patent protection for pharmaceutical . . . products commensurate with
its obligations under Article 27’ which provides that, in that situation, the WTO
member in question must at least provide, as from that date, ‘a means by which
applications for patents for such inventions can be filed.’ As follows from the
wording of that provision, Article 27 of the TRIPs Agreement includes the
obligation to make inventions of pharmaceutical products patentable.
110 A technical teaching remains an invention within the meaning of Article 27 TRIPS if it is
anticipated or rendered obvious by the relevant prior art and for this reason not patentable.
111 See Carlos M. Correa, The GATT Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights: New Standards for Patent Protection, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., 327, 328 (1994);
DE CARVALHO, supra note 39, at 313.
112 Amy Kapczynski, supra note 107, at 1597; see also Zoee Lynn Turrill, Finding the Patent
Balance: The Novartis Glivec Case and the TRIPS Compliance of India's Section 3(d) Efficacy
Standard, 44 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1555, 1581 et seq. (2013).
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which a structural obviousness can be presumed, since they are merely a modified
form of substances already known in the prior art. This reading would be consistent
with the understanding that “technical advance” 113 may be regarded as an (optional)
part of the inventive step test under Article 27 (1) of TRIPS. The “enhanced efficacy”
would represent the technical advance required for the new form of a known
substance to be patented.
When considering the TRIPS conformity of the provision, it might be useful to
check how the competent patent offices in Europe and in the U.S. would assess
similar situations under Article 56 of the European Patent Convention114 or
U.S. Code § 103.115 If one accepts that the practices of the EPO and the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) are TRIPS-compliant,116 then potential
examination by a WTO panel would likely concentrate on the differences of the rules
adopted and of the practices governed by them.117
In Europe, the examiner would regard the new form of the known substance as
being patentable when either the preparation of the compound implies an inventive
step118 or the properties disclosed by the applicant are unexpected. These properties
might be different from those indicated in the prior art or they might be the same,
but enhanced. If surprising, they could make the product claim valid. By contrast, if
the new form indeed presented an enhanced efficacy but such an improvement was
foreseeable, this would represent a motivation to modify the prior art as proposed in
the patent application. Under the problem-solution approach, the technical advance
over the prior art is an ambiguous element for the purpose of patentability. If
predictable indeed, it is an argument against and not for the existence of an
inventive step.
Before the USPTO, the situation would be similar. If the product is structurally
similar to a class of known compounds, then it would be considered prima facie
obvious. To overcome an objection under U.S.C. § 103, the applicant must show in
this case either that the prior art does not “disclose or render obvious a method for
making the substance”119 or that the substance has unexpected and superior
properties.120

See discussion supra Part III, Paragraph A (1), of this article.
See EPC, supra note 24, Art. 56 (inventive step).
115 Conditions for Patentability; Non-obvious Subject Matter, 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1999).
116 For such an approach see also Du, supra note 38, at 244; Lee, supra note 94, at 309.
117 See Lee, supra note 94, at 309.
118 See T 595/90, Decision of 24 May 1993, OJ EPO 1994, at 695, Reasons for the Decision no. 5
(according to which a “product which can be envisaged as such with all characteristics determining
its identity together with its properties in use, i.e. an otherwise obvious entity, may become
nevertheless non-obvious and claimable as such if there is no known way or applicable (analogy)
method in the art to make it and the claimed methods for its preparation are therefore the first to
achieve this in an inventive manner”). See also EPO, supra note 61, at 220; German Federal
Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH), 10 September 2009—Xa ZR 130/07—“Escitalopram”;
House of Lords, Generics (UK) Limited and others (Appellants) v H Lundbeck A/S (Respondents)
[2009] UKHL 12 on appeal from: [2008] EWCA Civ 311.
119 In re Hoeksema, 399 F.2d 269, 274, 158 USPQ 597, 601 (CCP A 1968); see also U.S. PAT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, Ch. 2100,
§ 2144.09 [hereinafter MPEP].
120 See MPEP, supra note 119, Chapter 2100, Section 2145.
113
114
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The provisions of Section 3(d) of the IPA 2005 and Bill No. 5402/13 are therefore
not entirely unlike these regional or national practices. 121 However, they do differ
from them in two main respects:
(i) for the new form to be protected, the claimed product must show an
enhancement in the known efficacy.
New effects which manifest
themselves by inventive uses are not relevant to pass the test under
Section 3(d) of the IPA.122 If the new form may be purified or produced only
through an inventive method, then the latter does not matter either for the
validity of the product claim.
(ii) According to the Supreme Court of India,123 the term efficacy, in the field of
pharmaceutical invention, is said to comprise only therapeutic efficacy. 124
Other advantages presented by the new form—e.g. better biodegradability
or stability—are irrelevant.
On the basis of these differences, two WTO-law challenges against the
regulation are abstractly possible.
First, one could argue that the provision implies a discrimination against
specific pharmaceutical inventions.
However, this reasoning would not be
persuasive. Section 3(d) IPA 2005 applies to all chemical substances. Thus, even if
the explanatory note refers to new forms which are the subject matter of patent
applications more frequently in the pharmaceutical field than in others, the main
provision applies to all chemical sectors. Of course, a WTO-complaint would likely
raise the issue in the form of a de facto rather than a de jure discrimination. But in
this form, the claims would not be convincing. The requirements for finding a
discrimination de facto under Article 27(1) of TRIPS as specified by the WTO-case
law are very strict. The adverse effects of the provision contested should be limited
to the allegedly discriminated sector. Further, the differential disadvantage imposed
by the challenged measure must be without justification. 125 None of these two
cumulative elements of the concept seems to recur with respect to the proposed
Brazilian legislation or the followed Indian model. There is no evidence indeed that
the applicability of the proposed “Section 3(d)”-like provision to chemical products
other than pharmaceutical ingredients would be a “sham.”126 There is no reason to
assume that the improvement—required by the provision in order to grant a valid
patent for a new form of a known compound—is not also necessary for granting a
valid patent for other types of new (but structurally obvious) products. 127 Since Bill
121 See the analysis by Rajarshi Sen & Adarsh Ramanujan, supra note 107 at 170, 173 et seq.;
Adarsh Ramanujan & Rajarshi Sen, Pruning the Evergreen Tree: Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents
Act 1970, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., 135, 140 et seq. (2009).
122 See Basheer, supra note 105, at 24 et seq.
123 See Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 106, at ¶ 180.
124 See also Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks of India, GUIDELINES FOR
EXAMINATION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS IN THE FIELD OF PHARMACEUTICALS, October 2014, 10.5 et
seq.
125 See Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, Report of the Panel
WT/DS114/5 (circulated November 12, 1998), 7.101 et seq.
126 Id. at 7.104.
127 In Europe, for instance, if the invention consists not in creating a new device with a new
functionality, but in modifying a specific pre-existing device—e.g. modifying a straightening
machine for profilates by replacing the mechanical cylinders with hydraulic ones with a resulting
increase in efficiency—the modified device may be regarded as new. It will be considered
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No. 5402/13 intends to codify technical progress as a general requirement for
protection in all technical fields, a discrimination complaint would be, as reshaped by
the reform in the Brazilian legal context, even more unjustified than the followed
Indian normative model.
As a second challenge, one could argue that the provision creates additional
criteria for patentability. It may indeed prevent product protection for substances
which may be novel and inventive within the meaning of Article 27 of TRIPS. 128
Nevertheless, this argument also seems questionable.
Article 27 of TRIPS requires patent protection for all inventions which are novel,
inventive, and industrially applicable. If the invention consists of a product, it is the
product which must meet these requirements, not the method for its manufacture or
the uses made possible by its properties. 129 It may be true that in some regional or
national practice the inventive character of a structurally obvious substance can be
borrowed from its unexpected effects when used for a specific purpose or from the
method for making it. So under European and U.S. case law, even if the existence
and the properties of an enantiomer were foreseeable, a product claim for it may be
allowed for it if the prior art does not indicate any obvious method for resolving the
racemate.130 This practice is not, however, imposed by WTO obligations. As long as

non-obvious if the modification implies some unpredictable improvement over the closest prior art.
In most cases, this improvement regards the efficiency of the device—i.e., its ability to produce
increased or equivalent effect with minor energy, time, or effort.
128 This is apparently the opinion of the European Commission, Director General for Trade,
Letter of 20 March 2014, Ref. Ares(2014)824810 in commenting the Draft Guidelines of the Indian
Patent Office; see also on the same subject Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA), Comments by the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) on
August 12, 2014, Revision to Draft Guidelines For Examination Of Patent Applications In The Field
Of Pharmaceuticals, p. 3, where the following remarks may be found:
TRIPS outlines three substantive criteria for patentability—novelty, inventive
step, and capability of industrial application—and does not permit WTO Members
to impose additional requirements for patentability of inventions beyond these
three criteria. The additional requirement under Section 3(d) of the Patents Act
thus contravenes TRIPS, as it deprives innovators of patent protection for new
forms of known substances that fully meet the TRIPS requirements of novelty,
inventive step, and capability for industrial application.
(Both opinions are available at http://www.ipindia.nic.in/iponew/comments_PharmaceuticalGuidelin
es/FeedBack_Pharmaceuticals.htm). For a similar view, see also the written Testimony of Roy F.
Waldron, Chief Intellectual Property Counsel of Pfizer Inc., before the House Committee on Ways
and Means, Subcommittee on Trade, on the occasion of the Hearing in US-India Trade Relations:
Opportunities and Challenges (March 13, 2013) where it is observed that:
This provision [Section 3(d) of the India Patent Act of 1970] requires certain types
of inventions to show ‘enhanced efficacy’ which limits substantially the ability to
obtain a patent. Not only is this term unclear, but it goes beyond the specific
requirements of patents under the WTO’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement including novelty, inventive step, industrial
applicability, and sufficient disclosure for carrying out the invention.
For similar conclusions, see also Susan Fyan, Pharmaceutical Patent Protection and Section 3(D): A
Comparative Look at India and the U.S., 15 VA. J. OF L. & TECH. 198, 199, 224 (2010); BERTHOLD,
supra note 46, at 181.
129 See KRAßER, PATENTRECHT, 6th ed., Munich 2009, 141 and 235 et seq.
130 See Jonathan M. Spenner, Obvious to Try: Obviousness of Chemical Enantiomers in View of
Pre and Post KSR Analysis, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 469, 487 et seq. (2008).
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the structure and the existence of the product are obvious, Article 27 of TRIPS does
not require any legal protection for it in the form of a product patent.
Section 3(d) of the IPA 2005 regards only substances which represent a specific
new form of a known class of molecules. The existence of these substances will
generally be predictable. Their structure may be considered obvious against a prior
art including the substance from which they are derived. Member States are not
obliged—following the European practice—to consider a compound inventive because
of the difficulties overcome to make it or because of the surprising effects it displays
when used for a specific purpose. Despite that, a Member State may decide to do so
(e.g., consider inventive a structurally obvious compound when some surprising
effects are shown). If they do so, there is no evident logical or legal argument under
Article 27 of TRIPS as to why they should not be allowed to select at the same time—
for policy-related considerations—which types of surprising effects or improvements
may justify the grant of a valid patent, as long as such requirement applies uniformly
to all product inventions.131 Bill No. 5402/13, like the Indian normative model from
which it is inspired, seems to have adopted such a selection. The legislature decided
that the properties of the compound may matter for patent protection, but only when
they imply an increase in the known efficacy. Indian case law defines efficacy under
Section 3(d) of the IPA 2005 to mean the therapeutic effect where pharmaceutical
inventions are concerned.132 Against this background, the possible effect of the
provision—in the pharmaceutical field—is to direct private investment versus
research of (i) new chemical entities with any useful properties, or (ii) new forms of
existing compounds implying a specific technical advance over the prior art, and (iii)
to discourage investment (or at least patent applications) directed to new forms of
known compounds that do not present an improvement of the efficacy predictable on
the basis of the closest prior art. 133 Such a choice does not seem to be constrained by
Article 27 of TRIPS. A mandate to consider all properties and advantages of the
claimed structure, as predicated by In Re Papesch,134 is not to be inferred from
Article 27 of TRIPS, regardless of how reasonable such an approach might be. 135
Further, the Member States are not obliged to grant a product patent for an obvious
subject matter only because the method of making it involves an inventive step. In
this case, the availability of a method claim is sufficient to comply with Article 27 of
TRIPS. Section 3(d) IPA 2005 does not limit the patentability of a new and inventive
method for obtaining the substances to which the exclusion itself applies.
The provision may give rise anyway to the following problem: the wording of
Section 3(d) of the IPA 2005 might end up preventing a grant when the applicant has
disclosed for the first time surprising new properties and effects of a new form of a
131
132
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Contra Du, supra note 38, at 244.
See Novartis Supreme Court Decision, Civil Appeal Nos. 2706-2716, 2728, and 2717-2727,

133 See Amy Kapczynski, J.D., Engineered in India—Patent Law 2.0, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 497,
498 (2013).
134 In re Application of Viktor Papesch, 315 F.2d 381 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
135 See generally Harold C. Wegner, Post-KSR Chemical Obviousness in Light of Pfizer v. Apotex
(2007), available at http://www.patenthawk.com/blog_docs/070613_PostKSRChemicalObviousness
.pdf. Wegner weighs in on the approach in Papesch, by examining the patentability of structurally
obvious compounds, and on the judgment in Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir.
2007), which seems to question this approach.
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known substance that allows a use other than the use predictable on the basis of the
properties of the class of known compounds. 136 If this is the case, it could be argued
that Section 3(d) of the IPA 2005 excludes protection for an invention which is new
and inventive within any possible meaning under Article 27 of TRIPS. Such cases
may be a rare occurrence with respect to the substances described in Section 3(d) of
the IPA 2005 and Article 3 of Bill No. 5402/13. Nevertheless, by interpretation
through the courts or by amendment through the legislative process, such an
outcome ought to be avoided based on the principle of equal treatment to which every
inventor is entitled according to Article 27 of TRIPS.
b. Practical Aspects
The Indian literature has addressed the difficulties to which the application of
Section (3)(d) of the IPA—in light of its explanatory clause—could give rise. Some of
them are worth mentioning.
The first concern comes from the fact that the rule should apply to derivatives
from known substances. However, the concept of derivatives is not clarified in the
Indian legislation. This holds true also for Bill No. 5402/13. The same substance can
be considered to derive from several crystalline forms of the same class of
compounds, which in turn may present a different degree of efficacy or no efficacy at
all. As a consequence, the claimed compound may be considered a significant or less
significant improvement depending on which substance is used as tertium
comparationis.137
Second, the provision makes patentability conditional upon enhancement in the
known efficacy. Nonetheless, for the same substance, the prior art may indicate
different technical effects. It is not clear how the rule is to be interpreted when the
effect indicated for the known compounds in the prior art is different from the effect
indicated in the later patent application for the new forms.138
Third, at the priority date, evidence for therapeutic efficacy may not exist at all.
It is unclear whether further evidence may be submitted during the grant procedure
and whether post-published dates may be considered.139
By addressing these practical aspects one should consider that for novelty,
inventive step, or patentability the Brazilian Patent Office can rely on the practice
elaborated on by other countries, as well as on preliminary reports on patentability
prepared for PCT applications. The provision discussed here, if enacted, would have
no equivalent in the PCT rules or in European or U.S. legislation. The only practice

See BERTHOLD, supra note 46, at 183.
See Shamnad Basheer & T. Prashant Reddy, The “Efficacy” of Indian Patent Law: Ironing
out the Creases in Section 3(d), 5 SCRIPTED 232, 240 (2008), available at
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol5-2/basheer.pdf; THAKUR, supra note 104, at 317 et seq.
138 See BERTHOLD, supra note 46, at 183. The same interpretative problem exists when the
prior art does not suggest any technical effect for the known substances to which the compounds
claimed in the pending patent application or in the granted patent are compared.
139 See also Du, supra note 38, at 251 et seq.
136
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to which a reference could be made would be that of the Indian Patent Office and
imitating countries, such as Argentina140 or the Philippines.141
5. Policy Considerations
The purpose of Section (3)(d) of the IPA 2005 is—according to the case law and
the literature—to foster incremental innovation and to prevent so called
“evergreening.” Under this notion a part of the literature and case law understands
the attempt of originator companies through the filing of subsequent patent
applications for new forms of a known compound, specific selection of a known
chemical formula or more specific uses of an already known application to prolong
the exclusivity for a specific and already patented product, mostly commercially
successful drugs.142
With the aim of preventing this practice, the Indian provision, as well as the
Brazilian Proposal, ban patents for the following categories of inventions: (1) all new
uses of substances already known; (2) new forms of known substances, even if a new
use and surprising new effect are shown; and (3) new uses of known processes unless
such process results in a new product or employs at least one new reactant. Against
this background and by considering the subject matter concerned, three objections
might be brought against the exclusions provided under Section 3(d) of the IPA 2005
and proposed under Bill No. 5402/13.
140 In Argentina, the Patent Act was not amended; however, exclusions similar to those provided
under Section 3(d) of the IPA were framed in the guidelines for the examination of the Argentinian
Patent Office through three joint Resolutions of the Ministerio de Industria, the Ministerio de Salud,
and the Instituto Nacional de la Propiedad Industrial. See Resolución Conjunta 118/2012, 546/2012
y 107/2012—Apruébanse las pautas para el examen de Patentabilidad de las solicitudes de Patentes
Sobre Invenciones Químico Farmacéuticas, Law No. 24.425, 32.392 B.O. 17-19, (May 8, 2012).
141 Section 22 of the Philippines Intellectual Property Code reads as follows:
Discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods, and in the case of
drugs and medicines, the mere discovery of a new form or new property of a
known substance which does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy
of that substance, or the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a
known substance, or the mere use of a known process unless such known process
results in a new product that employs at least one new reactant. For the purpose
of this clause, salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle
size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations, and other derivatives
of a known substance shall be considered to be the same substance, unless they
differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy.
Intellectual Property Code of the Phillipines (Republic Act No. 8293, 1997), as amended by Act No.
9502 (2008).
142 Kate S. Gaudry, Evergreening: a common practice to protect new drugs, 29 NAT.
BIOTECHNOL. 876 et seq. (2011); for an analysis or a criticism of the term evergreening in the field of
patent rights see John Thomas, Patent “Evergreening”: Issues in Innovation and Competition, CRS
Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress; MONICA DONGHI, PATENT
STRATEGY IN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: ARE ADDITIONAL PATENTS VALUABLE? 43 (2014); Scott
Parker & Kevin Mooney, Is ‘Evergreening’ a Cause for Concern? A Legal Perspective, 13 J. COM.
BIOTECH. 235 et seq. (2007); Sarah B. Myers, A Healthy Solution for Patients and Patents: How
India’s Legal Victory Against a Pharmaceutical Giant Reconciles Human Rights with Intellectual
Property Rights, 10 VAND J. ENT. & TECH. L. 763, 774 (2008); Zoee Lynn Turrill, supra note 112, at
1557-1559; Du, supra note 38, at 238 et seq.
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The first objection concerns the consistency between the purposes and the effect
of these exclusions. Some of the inventions which Section (3)(d) of the IPA 2005
excludes from patent protection constitute exactly the incremental innovations the
development of which the provision intends to foster.143 This seems particularly true
for new uses of known compounds. The disclosure of a new medical or non-medical
use for a known compound may enrich the public even more than the development of
new substances. The investment required and the risks connected may be as
significant as in the case of a completely new class of compounds. 144
Second, granting a patent for the new use of a known compound or new forms of
known compounds does not imply “evergreening” if, under this concept, the
prolonging of protection for an embodiment already disclosed in a previous patent is
understood.145 Such a situation is, in principle 146, not possible under the EPC,
143

(2009).

See Aditya Kant, Section 3(d): ‘New’ Indian Perspective, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS., 285, 290

144 See KRAßER, supra note 129, at 249; Neurim Pharmaceuticals (1991) Ltd v. ComptrollerGeneral of Patents, Court of Appeal, London, UK, (March 8, 2011, Case no. [2011] EWCA Civ 228);
see also Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak delivered on May 3, 2012, Case C‑130/11, Rn. 48,
available at http://curia.europa.eu.
145 See MONICA DONGHI, PATENT STRATEGY IN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: ARE ADDITIONAL
PATENTS VALUABLE? 43 (2014); Scott Parker & Kevin Mooney, Is ‘Evergreening’ a Cause for Concern?
A Legal Perspective, 13 J. COM. BIOTECH. 235 et seq.; Du, supra note 38, at 238 et seq.
146 Exceptions are indeed possible. If a patent covers a general chemical formula (hereinafter:
genus patent), the subsequent filing for a selection of the compounds comprised in the claimed genus
(hereinafter: species patent) may certainly result in the term of protection for the species being
extended. On an abstract level, a company might decide not to disclose the information about the
superior properties of specific compounds falling under the claimed genus in the first patent
application, thus leaving room for subsequent applications claiming the specific compounds falling
under the claimed genus; see HYEWON AHN, SECOND GENERATION PATENTS IN PHARMACEUTICAL
INNOVATION 109 et seq. (2014). But such a strategy involves some risk for the originator.
Eventually, competitors might also discover the useful and superior properties of the selected
compounds and file their own patent applications. Furthermore, such a strategy would hardly be
compatible with the best mode requirement provided under U.S. patent law; see also BERTHOLD,
supra note 46, at 127. Even though the best mode requirement is no longer a ground for
invalidating a granted patent under U.S. law, it is still a ground for rejecting the application. The
applicant interested in protection in the U.S. and other jurisdictions should tailor the content of the
patent specification to the strictest legal jurisdiction for which protection will be sought already in
the first national filing. Otherwise the chance of claiming a valid priority of the first deposit in that
legal jurisdiction might be at risk. Another situation where an extension in the term protection
theoretically might arise is when a first patent has been granted for a pro-drug and a subsequent
patent for the metabolite. This is true only when case law takes the view that the patent for the
metabolite is valid and infringed by the marketing of a pro-drug already known at the time of filing
of the patent application for the metabolite. So far, no court decision has reached such a conclusion;
see Richard Li-dar Wang and Pei-Chen Huang, Patent Protection of Pharmacologically Active
Metabolites: Theoretical and Technological Analysis on the Jurisprudence of Four Regions, 29 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY L. J. 489, 493 et seq. (2013). Lastly, a borderline
situation exists when a patent has been granted for polymorphs, whilst an older patent discloses
another crystalline form of the same compound less stable than the one later patented. If it is no
longer possible to produce the older form without the presence of the patented new polymorphs since
seeds of said new polymorphs have spread in the environment, the patentee could take the stance
that practicing the prior art would necessarily result in the younger patent being infringed under
the so called disappearing polymorphs theory. In any case, as shown infra in the text, provisions
similar to those in Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act are not necessary to properly handle the
situations mentioned in this footnote.
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although it allows patents on new uses or new forms of known substances. On the
basis of a patent for a new form of an existing substance, the patentee may prevent
others from using the new form, but not the older basic compound. 147 On the basis of
a patent for new uses, the patentee may prevent others from using the substance for
the new purpose, but not for purposes already known. Under the EPC, no patentee
may prohibit others from using a technical teaching which was already disclosed in
prior art published before the critical date of the asserted patent, or which derives
from it in an obvious way.
This does not mean that pharmaceutical companies might not be successful in
prolonging their market positions with respect to specific products even after the
patent on the chemical entity concerned has expired. Such situations, however, are
the result of factors other than the mere granting of so called secondary patents. In
the pharmaceutical field, they may arise from a restrictive notion of generics in the
applicable regulatory legislation 148 or from the ability of the patentee to induce
prescribing doctors to switch to (patented) follow-up drugs before the original basic
compound becomes patent-free.149 If the purpose of the Reform were only to prevent
“evergreening,” other measures would be more efficient and less radical.
For instance:
(i) A general prior art defense according to which (a) no one may be refrained
from performing an activity which fully corresponds to what was done
before the filing or priority date of the asserted patent; or (b) no patent may
restrict anyone from practicing technology included in the prior art
available to the public prior to the priority date of the patent or resulting
from it in an obvious manner. Both defenses are not coextensive: the first
excludes, for instance, that, on the basis of a patent for a metabolite, the
commercialization of the pro-drug may be prevented, even if the patent
asserted remains valid, since the pro-drug was not available to the public
under the applicable patent law. The second argument is a “classic”
practicing prior art defense, which applies even when the embodiment
accused of infringing the patent is not anticipated, but made obvious by the
prior art. In this way, it would be legally clear for every company that no
patent on dosage or administration or specific patient group indication may

See also AHN, supra note 146, at 225 et seq.
This case may occur when a company files a first patent application for a new chemical
entity and later a further patent application for a specific crystalline form of the substance. If the
patentee pursues the regulatory approval only for the crystalline form and not for the chemical
entity that is the subject of the first patent application, and if the applicable medical law does not
allow for the generic companies to refer—by requesting the approval for the original substance
which has become patent free—to the later patented crystalline form, the generic companies will
likely refrain from entering the market. The approval of the original chemical entity, which the
patentee has omitted to do, would incur costs that normally none of the generic competitors are
prepared to bear. For these examples, see BERTHOLD, supra note 46, at 130 et seq.; PHILIP W.
GRUBB, PATENTS FOR CHEMICALS, PHARMACEUTICALS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY: FUNDAMENTAL OF
GLOBAL LAW, PRACTICE AND STRATEGY 243 (4th ed. 2010).
149 For an analysis of this phenomenon from the perspective of European competition law, see
Bengt Domeij, Anticompetitive Marketing in the Context of Pharmaceutical Switching in Europe, 273
ff., in JOSEF DREXL & NARI LEE, PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION, COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW: A
TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVE (2013).
147
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prevent a competitor from using the basic substance for purposes or
indications already disclosed.
(ii) With respect to selection inventions, a rule according to which a prior art
reference disclosing a general formula in principle anticipates all the
compounds comprised by said formula—even in absence of “an
individualized disclosure”—if these compounds may be produced on the
basis of the method described in the reference concerned.
(iii) A broad definition of generics in regulatory law,150 so that even if a
patentee has obtained patent protection for a new form of a known
substance and the authorization only for this specific new form, the generic
competitor remains free to refer to the dossier concerning this new form of
the substance to obtain an authorization for the basic compound already
disclosed in the prior art.
(iv) A legislative clarification in antitrust law of the situations where “product
hopping” represents an abuse and where it does not.
Lastly, a third objection against the reform might be based on the effects which
the patent exclusions discussed could produce on indigenous innovation. It might be
argued that denying patents for new forms or uses of known compounds could
adversely affect the domestic industry. They constitute a type of innovation with
respect to which emerging industrial countries may be more active. Such a
statement was made for the corresponding exclusion in the Indian Patent Act,151 and
it might also be relevant to Bill No. 5402/13. Brazilian pharmaceutical innovators
are likely to be more successful in discovering new uses and new forms of known
substances than creating new chemical entities. 152 Despite that, there is no basis for
assuming that such a reform will negatively or positively affect the pace of
innovation in Brazil or any other country adopting similar rules. Changes in
municipal patent legislation do not necessarily translate into modifications in the
behavior of domestic companies. This holds true even in those fields—such as the
pharmaceutical sector—where there seems to be a causal link between patents and
innovation. Indeed, after the significant growth of free trade in the last thirty years,
the functions that the patent system is supposed to perform should be viewed in a
global context.
Assuming that, at least in the pharmaceutical field,153 patent protection can
prevent a market failure and enable investment in research and development that
See the analysis by BERTHOLD, supra note 46, at 128 et seq. and 238 et seq.
See Mueller, supra note 87, at 558 (commenting on Section 3(d) of the IPA and the exclusion
for use claim as follows: “In its zeal to prevent pharmaceutical product patent holders from
extending their monopolies through follow-on process patents, India may have suppressed an
important means of stimulating indigenous innovation.”); see also Basheer, supra note 105, at 24;
Du, supra note 38, at 254 et seq.
152 See Kenneth C. Shadlen, The Politics of Pharmaceutical Patent Examination in Brazil, in
KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE: REASSERTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST 139, 156 et seq. (Leonardo
Burlamaqui et al., eds., 2012); see also KUNISAWA, supra note 11, at 127 et seq.
153 The effects of patent protection on innovation are still unclear. The literature seems to agree
that the patent system works differently in the various technical sectors and that at least for the
chemical and pharmaceutical industry the patent protection is needed to prevent a market failure.
This opinion—supported by some empirical evidence—is based on the specific features of the
pharmaceutical market: the high costs of developing a marketable product—that is, an authorized
drug—and the low costs of reproducing industrially the drug and eventually getting an
150
151
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would otherwise be prevented by free-riding, patent exclusions in this sector can
indeed deter innovation efforts. More specifically, they can reduce the outlays in the
development of the type of inventions excluded from patentability. Whether or not a
patent act providing for such exclusions might have such an effect on the companies
located in either the territory to which said patent act applies or abroad depends on
the economic significance of those markets for the companies concerned. The
following example may be cited to clarify this obvious154 assumption.
The U.S. and the EU are still the world’s two largest pharmaceutical markets. 155
If patents are available in the EU and the U.S. for a specific category of inventions,
this legal protection will foster innovative efforts by all companies operating in the
field and for which the U.S. and the EU represent a significant 156 source of revenue
from sales or licensing. Where these companies are located—in Europe, in the U.S.,
or in South America—is less relevant. For these reasons, the fact that specific
medical applications of known compounds, patentable abroad, are not eligible for
protection in Brazil, might not affect the behavior of Brazilian innovators. This holds
true at least for those pharmaceutical companies located in Brazil for which the EU
and the U.S. markets are a sufficient source of revenue to justify continuing to invest
in such incremental innovations. Therefore, while the exclusions proposed in
Bill No. 5402/13 could not harm indigenous innovators, they could benefit indigenous
manufacturers. If other countries imitate Indian legislation in this respect, the
exclusions enacted would give domestic Brazilian generic manufacturers the
opportunity to also export to those markets drugs falling under the provisions
corresponding to Section 3(d) of the IPA. Patent exclusions for first, second, and
further medical indications could not only help keep down prices of pharmaceutical
products in the internal market, but also promote the domestic generic industry
without harming domestic originators.157

authorization for it as a generic copy once the medicine has been brought to the market. See Bruce
Lehman, The Pharmaceutical Industry and the Patent System, International Intellectual Property
Institute,
Washington,
at
7
et
seq.
(2003),
available
at
http://users.wfu.edu/mcfallta/DIR0/pharma_patents.pdf; D. Lakdawalla & N. Sood, Incentives to
Innovate, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF THE BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 143
(2012); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN
PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 40
(2007). At the same time, economic studies suggest that stronger patent protection in the
pharmaceutical fields might be related to faster innovation, but only in countries with higher levels
of economic development; see Yi Qian, Do National Patent Laws Stimulate Domestic Innovation in a
Global Patenting Environment? A Cross-Country Analysis of Pharmaceutical Patent Protection,
1978-2002, 89 REV. ECON. & STAT., 436, 450 (2007).
154 See EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 110 et
seq. (1951); see also Nuno Pires de Carvalho, The Rule of Patent Law (RPL) as Established by the
TRIPS Agreement and Its Role in Promoting Trade Rather than Invention, in PATENT LAW IN
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Ruth L. Okediji & Margo A. Bagley eds., 2014), 673, 675.
155 See IMS Pharmaceutical World Review, 2013.
156 Significant means high enough not only to recover the investment made but also to
adequately remunerate it.
157 This assumption seems to be reasonable at least when the market affected by the patent
exclusions is of limited significance compared to the foreign markets where similar patent exclusions
do not apply.
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At the same time, this strategy of “sharing the benefit without sharing the
cost”158 of patent protection, if imitated by other countries, in the long term might
delay the development of new pharmaceutical uses for known compounds. The
incentive effect of the patent system depends on the revenues that it can guarantee
in the market. The broader the potential market that might be covered by a family of
valid patents, the stronger the incentive should be. It follows that if more countries
ban patents on pharmaceutical inventions, the stimulus to invest in these
innovations could become weaker.159 This assumption would hold true for all
companies operating in the field, irrespective of their geographical location. 160
Nevertheless, it might be argued that this was also true at the time when
Switzerland,161 Germany,162 Italy,163 or the Netherlands164 denied product protection
or even any patent protection to chemical or pharmaceutical inventions. These
Western countries make use of broad patent exclusions as long as they regard this as
being useful for their development.165 They benefited from the patent system
existing abroad and from a free imitation regime on the home market. 166
The counterargument might be that the world has radically changed since
then.167 At that time, the innovative countries could respond through protectionist
measures against products from those countries which denied adequate patent
protection for their citizens and industries. 168 That is not the case under today’s
WTO regime. In addition, international free trade has increased significantly since
the 19th Century.169
See FRITZ MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 79 (1958).
See Du, supra note 38, at 254.
160 The assumption is a logical one: evidence of the influence of foreign IP protection on the
innovation in large industrialized countries, such as the U.S. or the EU, is inconclusive. See, e.g.,
Larry D. Qiu & Huayang Yu, Does the Protection of Foreign Intellectual Property Rights Stimmulate
Innovation in the US?, 18 REV. INT’L ECON., 882, 883 (2010): the authors of this contribute did not
find evidence that making patent protection available in foreign markets has affected the innovation
rate in the United States; as consequence, they argue that the U.S. market is large enough to offer
sufficient incentives for originators to invest in pharmaceutical innovation.
161 See Barbara Dölemeyer, Wege der Rechtsvereinheitlichung. Zur Auswirkung internationaler
Verträge auf europäische Patent- und Urheberrechtsgesetze des 19. Jahrhunderts, in ASPEKTE
EUROPÄISCHER RECHTGESCHICHTE. FESTGABE FÜR HELMUT COING ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG.
EUROPÄISCHES RECHTSDENKEN IN GESCHICHTE UND GEGENWART 65, 83 (Horn et al. eds., 1982).
162 On the patent exclusion for chemical substances in Germany, see GEISSLER, DER UMFANG
DES STOFFSCHUTZES FÜR CHEMISCHE ERFINDUNGEN: EINE RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE UNTERSUCHUNG
ANHAND DER RECHTSLAGE IN FRANKREICH, DEN USA, SKANDINAVIEN UND DEUTSCHLAND, 3 et seq.
(1972).
163 See F.M. Scherer & S. Weisburst, Economic Effects of Strengthening Pharmaceutical Patent
Protection in Italy, 26 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 1009 et seq. (1995).
164 Netherlands abolished the patent system in 1869, and reintroduced a patent protection for
nationals and foreigners in 1912. See ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL
PATENTS: THE NETHERLANDS, 1869-1912; SWITZERLAND, 1850-1907, 19 et seq. (1971).
165 See Yi Qian, supra note 153, at 450.
166 See JAKKRIT KUANPOTH, PATENT RIGHTS IN PHARMACEUTICAL IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE, at 100 (2011).
167 See GRUBB, supra note 148, at 57.
168 The limitations to the patentability of chemical and pharmaceutical compounds in
Switzerland were eliminated in 1907, after Germany threatened to introduce higher tariffs on Swiss
imports. See MACHLUP, supra note 158, at 5; PENROSE, supra note 154, at 16; WALTHER STUBER,
DIE PATENTIERBARKEIT DER CHEMISCHEN ERFINDUNGEN 26 et seq. (1907).
169 GRUBB, supra note 148, at 57.
158
159
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Again, this line of reasoning is based on a questionable equivalency. The WTO
regime limits the option to enact import restrictions and adopt unilateral retaliations
for developed as well as developing countries. There is no reason to see these
limitations as a trade concession by developed countries to less developed ones. It is
clear that any further inquiry into these political and economic questions would go
beyond the purpose of this paper and likely the skills of its author.
IV. PATENT TERM
A. Abolition of Minimum Term of Protection Under Article 40, Sole Paragraph of Law
No. 9279/96
As in most jurisdictions, Brazilian law provides patent protection for a term of
twenty years. At the same time, it includes a compensation mechanism that has no
counterpart in EU or U.S. law. Pursuant to the Sole Paragraph of Article 40 of Law
No. 9279/96, if the examination of the application and the patent grant takes more
than ten years, then the patent will last ten years from the issue date. The effect of
the rule is that the exclusivity right conferred by any patent in Brazil, irrespective of
the filing date and the applicant’s behavior, has a term of at least ten years, either
because the patent was granted before the ten-year pendency of the application or
because it was granted later, and Sole Paragraph of Article 40 of Law No. 9279/96
therefore applies.
The reform intends to abolish this provision. 170 If the Bill is enacted, all patents
granted by INPI will expire twenty years from the filing date.171
The purpose of Sole Paragraph of Article 40 of Law No. 9279/96 is to compensate
the patent owner for delays in the grant procedure. 172 This is a serious matter
affecting several jurisdictions, and not necessarily caused by inefficiencies on the
part of the competent patent office. Patent applications have grown in number and
size over the last twenty years.173 After the economic downturn between 2007 and
2012, this is likely to continue.174 Indeed, other Asian and non-Asian countries—
apart from Japan, China, Taiwan, and South Korea—are stepping up their

See Bill No. 5402/13, Art. 2 (Braz. 2013).
Utility models will reach the end of their term 15 years from the filing date. See id.
172 See Fernando Eid Philipp & Guilherme Toshihiro Takeishi, Legal Consequences of Backlog
Patent, 114 Revista da ABPI 35, 40 (2011).
173 See Bruno van Pottelsberghe, Lost property: The European patent system and why it doesn’t
work, at p. 21 (2009),
available at http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publicationdetail/publication/312-lost-property-the-european-patent-system-and-why-it-doesnt-work/.
174 With the exception of 2002 and 2009 the number of patent applications filed worldwide has
increased steadily since 1978 and totaled 2.35 million in 2012. In the same year, 195,308 PCT
applications were filed. Even though the latest data is twice the number published by the WIPO for
2000, the number of PCT applications filed annually remains relatively small with respect to the
number of applications filed worldwide with regional and national offices. For the reported data and
comparisons, see WIPO, World Intellectual Property Indicators, at § A, p. 43 et seq. (2013). On
possible reasons for the relatively limited interest in PCT filings, see MARKETA TRIMBLE, GLOBAL
PATENTS—LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT 27 et seq. (2012).
170
171
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international filings. Furthermore, the subsidy policy pursued by China 175 might
foster imitators, even though such practice still has to pass the scrutiny of WTO
rules. This would contribute to a further increase in global filing data.
Delays in examination affect not only—and not in every case—the applicants,
who in specific fields seem to be more interested in maintaining pendency of the
application than obtaining a decision on it quickly, 176 as the limited use of the PACE
Program177 by EPO applicants seems to demonstrate. 178 Delays create legal
uncertainty for competitors, too. They cannot always base their entrepreneurial
decisions on the assessment given by other patent offices for other members of the
same patent family. In the majority of jurisdictions, the applicant is entitled to
amend and limit the claims of the pending application, and could in this way possibly
obtain a patent on a different legal basis even if similar applications have been
rejected abroad.
In Brazil, where patent and utility models are subject to examination, delays are
significant. An examination, on average, takes more than eight years.179 Despite
that, in view of the arbitrary character that affects the uniform term of protection
granted by Article 33 of TRIPS, the intention to abolish the Sole Paragraph Law of
Article 40 of No. 9279/96 seems reasonable for three reasons.
First, the rule as drafted does not treat all patentees equally because the needs
of the technical sectors and the applicants concerned are different. For some of them,
it is convenient to maintain pendency of an application for several years 180 and to
have ten years of full protection after the products covered by the patent issued are
brought to market. This is true, for instance, in the case of patent applications for
products subject to administrative authorization. For other applicants, it might be of
no value to have the term extended because the time to bring the products to market

175 In China, the central government and local authorities provide different programs for
subsidizing the costs of foreign patent applications filed by domestic companies; see Haijun Jin/Yuli
Tu/Shutong Wang, Government—Backed Patent Funds in China, Tech Monitor, Oct‐Dec., 24 et seq.
(2013).
176 See, with reference to U.S. filing practices, Warren K. Mabey Jr., Deconstructing the Patent
Application Backlog: . . . A Story of Prolonged Pendency, PCT Pandemonium & Patent Pending
Pirates, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 208, 232, 236 et seq. (2010).
177 PACE is the acronym for the “Programme for accelerated prosecution of European patent
applications” introduced by the EPO in 1997. This programme made it possible for applicants to
have the application examined within shorter deadlines than otherwise provided by requesting the
EPO to issue the search report together with the opinion under Rule 62(1) EPC and the first
examination report; see Notice from the European Patent Office dated May 4, 2010 concerning the
program for accelerated prosecution of European patent applications—“PACE,” OJ EPO 352 (2010).
178 Apparently, only 7-8% of the applicants every year request accelerated prosecution, even
though it does not involve additional fees or costs. See EPO, IP5 Statistics Report 2012 Edition, at p.
7 (2013).
179 See Barbosa, supra note 10, at 142 (reporting data of 2011).
180 See Mabey, supra note 176, at 232, 236 et seq.; see also Eugenio Hoss, Delays in Patent
Examination and Their Implications under the TRIPS Agreement, MIPLC Master’s Thesis Series
(2010/11), http://www.miplc.de/research/, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2166853, p. 49. The
situation is different for pharmaceutical inventions, where the time to bring a product to market is
longer than the time needed to process a PCT application and get protection in the different
designated regional and national jurisdictions.
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is short, the technology in question becomes outdated more quickly, and protection is
therefore most important in the first few years after the filing date.181
Second, the rule is inefficient.182 It grants a compensation which de facto may go
beyond the loss the applicant has incurred for the pendency, but de jure falls short of
what would be necessary to avoid a violation of international law. 183 Indeed, after
the patent application has been published, serious competitors might refrain from
using the claimed technology because of the risk of being subject to a compensation
claim after the patent is issued. This holds particularly true when members of the
same patent family have been granted abroad after examination. By the same token,
commercial operators might refrain from ordering the claimed items from
competitors of the owner of the patent application. Indeed, in the post-grant phase,
use of the claimed products, if not delivered with the consent of the applicant, would
infringe the patent.184
De facto, the patent applicant in several cases might enjoy the advantages the
grant would ensure despite the absence of an exclusivity right. De jure, this is not
relevant from the perspective of a WTO consultation. WTO rules require that a
formal right to exclude be bestowed within a reasonable period of time. 185
Third, there are other ways to compensate applicants for pendency of the
application without creating legal uncertainty with respect to the term of the patent
right. I am not referring to the general task of improving the efficiency of the Patent
Office and reducing the pendency of patent applications. These are tremendous
undertakings requiring hiring efforts, cooperation agreements with other national or
regional Patent Offices, and a change in filing patterns that no single government
181 Id. at 49. Hoss observes that “[f]or some industries, especially in high technology fields, the
timely examination of patents is crucial, because they often refer to products with short life-cycles.
Those industries do not need a long period of protection, but a quick one.” See also Mabey, supra
note 176, at 232, 243 et seq. (2010); Harold C. Wegner, “Three Track” TRIPS Treaty Violations,
Testimony
to
the
USPTO
(July 27, 2010),
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wpcontent/uploads/2010/07/Wegner-ThreeTrack-July27.pdf.
Wegner observes that for some
technologies not granting a patent in the first few years after filing amounts effectively to “a denial
of patent protection altogether.”
182 See also Fabrício de Souza Oliveira, Comparative Analysis of the Extension Mechanisms of
Medicine Patent: a criticism of the Brazilian system, International Journal of Medicine and
Pharmacy, 2 (1), 29 et seq. (2014).
183 See also Ctr. for Strategic Stud. & Debates, supra note 1, at 70, et al.
184 Consider the case of a steel plant operator and a tender for a new plant. If a steel plant
maker takes part in the tender and proposes a new plant to the operator including a technology
covered by one or more patent applications still pending and owned by a competitor—for instance, a
specific rolling mill or process solution to roll the laminates—it would be very risky from a legal
point of view for the operator to accept this offer, even with a significant indemnification clause in
the event of infringement. Indeed, operating the plant—after the patent application has been
examined and the patent eventually granted—would involve an infringement of the product or
process claims. As far as the product claim is concerned, the product or device has not been placed
on the market with the consent of the patent owner. Therefore, no exhaustion doctrine applies and
the operation of the rolling mill is in violation. Obviously, the problem described above does not
have any significance for end products to be bought by private consumers and not commercial
companies, because the former would be entitled to continue to use the product—even after the
grant of the patent—because of the limitation of the right of the patent provided under Article 43(I)
of Law No. 9279/96. Similar exemptions for the private and non-commercial use of patented items
are provided for under the law of almost all WTO Members.
185 See de Carvalho, supra note 39, 667 et seq. See also Part VI, Paragraph B (2) of this article.
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can really handle on its own. Further, Brazilian law has already adopted some of the
measures proposed by the specialized literature to handle the backlogs, such as
deferred examination186 or hiring efforts.187 One way might be to provide the
applicant—after the patent application has been published—with a full right and not
merely an indemnification claim. This solution has already been adopted by
countries such as Italy,188 Poland,189 San Marino,190 and—to a certain extent—
France.191 It would first require the patent applicant to be able to initiate litigation
based on the published application, file a claim, and obtain a preliminary injunction
if equitable. At the same time, it would require that a competitor, sued on the basis
of a published patent application, be able to challenge the patentability of the
invention covered by the asserted claim before the Court grants the preliminary
injunction. From the point of view of fairness, attribution of a jus excludendi alios
and a full damage claim before the patent has been issued does not raise concerns in
those legal systems where utility models are accepted and registered as property
rights on technical inventions without examining the prior art. In fact, no difference
would exist between the right to exclusivity arising from a published patent
application or that resulting from a utility model.
In this regard, Brazil moreover is an exception internationally. Utility models
are subject to full examination on their merits. Whether the examination is imposed
by constitutional constraints is unclear to foreign observers. 192 If the question is to
be answered in the negative, the solution proposed above would be available, and
might eventually be combined with a reform of the utility model grant procedure. 193

See Law No. 9279/96, supra note 2, Art. 33.
Between 2004 and 2010 the number of examiners at the INPI increased from 150 to more
than 400,
see INPI, Balance and Perspectives—INPI in Transformation, at p. 13,
http://www.inpi.gov.br/images/stories/downloads/pdf/INPI_Relatorio Comunicacao_ingles .pdf.
188 See Article 120.1 & Article 52.1, Codice dei diritti di proprietà industriale (Industrial
Property Code, hereinafter cpi) (Italy). According to the mentioned provisions, it is possible to
obtain a preliminary injunction based on a published patent application and to lodge an
infringement proceeding on the merits. Moreover, the Court is entitled to grant the definitive
injunction only after the patent has been granted. See Roberto Romandini, La durata del brevetto e
dell’esclusiva, in DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE ITALIANO 703 et seq., 708 (Mario Franzosi & Massimo Scuffi
eds., 2014).
189 See EPO, National Law Relating to the EPC, at Chapter IIIA (2013).
190 See Article 228, Industrial Property Law (June 30, 2000, San Marino).
191 In France, the right to exclusivity takes effect after the patent application has been
published or notified to a third party if the claims have not been amended between the publication of
the application and grant of the patent. This implies that the applicant may lodge an infringement
proceeding. However, pursuant to Article 615-4 IPC, the court in charge has to stay the proceeding
until the grant of the patent. See Laurence Petit, The Enforcement of Patent Rights in France, in
PATENT ENFORCEMENT WORLDWIDE: A SURVEY OF 15 COUNTRIES: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DIETER
STAUDER 147 (Christopher Heath & Laurence Petit eds., 2005).
192 Designs are granted under Brazilian law without examination of novelty and individual
character, and this might argue prima facie for the assumption that jus excludendi granted without
an examination on the merits is not in conflict with Brazilian constitutional principles. At the same
time, the impact on free competition of a design right is considered far less relevant than the impact
resulting from a patent or a utility model. This is seen from compulsory licenses, which are
available for patents and utility models, but not for designs.
193 See infra Part VI, Paragraph, B (2) of this article.
186
187
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B. TRIPS Compliance
From the perspective of TRIPS, the proposal to abolish the minimum term of
protection provided by the Sole Paragraph of Article 40 of Law No. 9279/96 does not
give rise, per se, to any issues. Article 33 of TRIPS only requires a term of protection
for twenty years from the filing date. Admittedly, one could argue for a systematic
reading of Article 33 of TRIPS in conjunction with Article 62(2) of TRIPS, and in this
case try to maintain that the former requires the Member States to provide the
patent holders with a term of “effective protection,” minus a period of time for
processing the application which must be reasonable under Article 62(2) of TRIPS.
However, such a reading of Article 33 has already been rejected by a WTO panel 194
and by a WTO appellate body.195 Both came to the conclusion that Article 33 lends
no support “to the notion of an ‘effective’ term of protection as distinguished from a
‘nominal’ term of protection.”196 This conclusion is worthy of approval. The Treaty
clearly differentiates between the “term of protection” (Article 33 of TRIPS) and the
“period of protection” (Article 62(2) of TRIPS),197 and takes into account that the
latter, because of the grant procedure, may be shorter than the former.
Consequently, where the law of a country provides for a term of protection that
is shorter than twenty years, that situation is non-compliant with Article 33 of
TRIPS even if the grant procedure is so fast that the effective term of protection in
that country is longer than that of the majority of WTO Members. Conversely, if the
law of the country provides for a term of protection of 20 years from the filing date,
this situation is consistent with Article 33 of TRIPS even if the grant procedure in
that country systematically takes more than ten years and the applicants, under the
same national law, were entitled only to a compensation claim—but not to injunctive
relief against acts of exploitation committed before the grant of the patent—with the
result that, for most of the patent’s life, the inventions were protected by a liability
rule and not a property rule.198
Nevertheless, in a similar situation other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement
might call for action on the part of the Member State concerned. 199

194 See Canada—Term of Patent Protection, Report of the Panel WT/DS170/R (circulated
May 5, 2000).
195 See Canada—Term of Patent Protection, Report of the Appellate Body WT/DSI170/AB/R, AB2000-7 (circulated Sept. 18, 2000).
196 See id. at 95.
197 Two other authentic versions of the Treaty—the Spanish and the French—use two different
expressions for the formal term of protection pursuant to Article 33 of TRIPS and the effective
period of protection referred to in Article 62(2) of TRIPS. See, respectively, in French the
expressions Durée de la protection and période de protection, and in Spanish Duración de la
protección and período de protección. The Portuguese version distinguishes between vigenza de
proteção and prazo de proteção. By contrast, the German official translation of the Treaty uses in
both Article 33 of TRIPS and Article 62(2) of TRIPS the expression Schutzdauer. The German
version, in any case, is not an authentic text.
198 According to Hoss, however, “there might be some particular cases where an excessive delay
could be considered a violation of Article 33 TRIPS, e.g., if the delay is so long that it goes beyond
the term protection.” Hoss, supra note 180, at 40.
199 See infra Part VI, Paragraph B(2) of this article.
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V. GOVERNMENT USE
A. Premise
Various TRIPS Member States allow government use of patented inventions. 200
By contrast, Law No. 9279/96 does not expressly regulate this power of the executive
branch. This does not mean that government uses of patented inventions are not
possible under Brazilian law. Pursuant to Article 71 of Law No. 9279/96, “in cases of
national emergency or of public interest, as declared in an act of the Federal
Executive Power, and provided the patent holder or his licensee does not fulfill such
need, a temporary and non-exclusive compulsory license for exploiting the patent
may be granted, ex officio, without prejudice to the rights of the respective title
holder.”201
According to the literature, this provision may cover cases such as the use of the
invention by a public administration contractor or by a public agency to perform a
public function, which in another legal system would fall under an exception of use
by the crown. However, the procedure is more burdensome. The authorization is
only possible when the patentee is not able or willing to fulfill the public need.
According to some commentators,202 such requirements make negotiations with the
patent holder necessary prior to granting the compulsory license.203 Furthermore,
the use must not only be public and non-commercial, but must also serve the public
interest. Hence, the regulation is considered stricter than what TRIPS would
require.
Whatever the shortcomings of the regulation in force, the declared purpose of
Bill No. 5402/13 is to streamline the procedure for the government to engage the use
of patented technologies. Thus, Bill No. 5402/13 proposes that Law No. 9279/96
should be supplemented with a new rule, entitled Article 43A, which would provide
as follows:204

200 For a brief comparative overview of the government use in other jurisdictions, see Celeste C.
Yang, Crown Use and Government Use, in COMPULSORY LICENCING—PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES AND
WAYS FORWARD 398 et seq. (Hilty Reto & Kung-Chung Liu eds., 2014) (proposing a distinction
between crown und government use); Ana Paula De Freitas Cosenza, O Uso Governamental das
Patentes—Uma possibilidade para a Saúde Pública no Brasil, Ph.D. Thesis, at 17 et seq. (Braz.
2010),
available
at
http://www.ie.ufrj.br/images/pos-graducao/pped/defesas/10Ana_Paula_de_Freitas_Cossenza.pdf; Blake Evan Reese, Do As I Say, Not As I Do: An International
and Comparative Study of Governments’ Rights to “Infringe” Patents in Light of the Federal Circuit’s
Recent Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and a Call for Congress to Modernize the Statute, 4
BUFFALO INTELL. PROP. L.J. 84, 106 et seq. (2006); ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
(ACIP), REVIEW OF CROWN USE PROVISIONS FOR PATENTS AND DESIGNS, 13 et seq. (Nov 2005).
201 The requirements provided under Article 71 of Law No. 9279/96 have been specified in
Decree No. 3,201, of October 6, 1999, lastly amended by Decree No. 4830/2003 of September 3, 2003.
202 See De Freitas Cosenza, supra note 200, at 27.
203 See MARISTELA BASSO ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN BRAZIL 95 (2010).
204 This proposal for reform is inspired by a previous proposal submitted by an authoritative
Brazilian Scholar, Denis Borges Barbosa, in Proposta para introduzir o uso público não comercial
das
patentes
no
direito
brasileiro,
2010,
available
at
http://www.denisbarbosa.addr.com/arquivos/200/economia/proposta_uso_patentes.pdf (last visited
Aug. 8, 2014).
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The Government, by Ordinance from the Minister of State concerned,
may use the subject matter of a patent or of a patent application, for
non-commercial purposes, without consent or authorization from the patent
holder or patent applicant, directly or upon contract or authorization to
third parties, for public interest purposes, including national defense and
social interest.
§ 1 Should the invention be a process, the public non-commercial use
of the patent or the patent application shall include the use in
relation to any product that may be obtained by the process that is
protected by the patent or the patent application;
§ 2 The Government shall notify the patent holder or patent applicant
upon public non-commercial use;
§ 3 Public non-commercial uses shall meet the following conditions:
I—not hinder the full exercise of the other rights of the patent
holder or patent applicant;
II—be non-exclusive, and not admit sub-licensing;
III—be undertaken exclusively to serve the goals of the Ordinance
that authorized it, resting assured that any other use that,
without the character of public non-commercial use, would
constitute an infringement of Article 42 of this Act, is hereby
prohibited;
§ 4 The remuneration for public non-commercial use shall be set by
the Government, taking into account the circumstances of each use,
and shall take into account the percentage that would customarily
incur upon a voluntary license between independent parties, applied
over the cost for the Government resulting from the use of the
subject matter of a patent or patent application, and weighed
according to the collaboration supplied by the patent holder in the
transfer of technology;
§ 5 In the case of patent applications, the remuneration shall be
legally deposited until the granting of the patent;
§ 6 The Judiciary shall not, in regard to public non-commercial use,
decide whether public interest purposes apply;
§ 7 Public non-commercial uses shall not be lifted, limited, or
interrupted by legal appeal over the appointed remuneration.
The proposed Article 43A is not intended to replace Article 71 of
Law No. 9279/1996, and therefore, both provisions would co-exist. This provision
also presents slightly different wording from the definition of government use
provided in Law No. 11484/2007 on the protection of Topographies of Integrated
Circuits, for which a public interest is not required. 205 Whether the difference is
relevant for the application of Article 43A will depend upon how the courts interpret
205 Pursuant to Article 47 of Law No. 11.484 of May 31, 2007 “the Public Authorities may make
public, non-commercial use of protected topographies, directly or by contracting or authorizing third
parties, observing the provisions of items III to VI of the main body of Article 49 and the provisions
of Article 51 of this Law.” See the English translation of the Law No. 11.484/2007 available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=272285.
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the term “public use.” If the latter only includes uses for public functions, then a
public interest, in this case, would exist as well, and the difference between the
proposed Article 43A and Article 47 of Law No. 11484/2007 would be only of a
stylistic nature.
B. TRIPS compliance
Article 31 of TRIPS expressly allows government use of patented inventions but
subjects them to the same procedural guarantees provided for other not authorized
uses. The only exception concerns the need for prior negotiations with the patentee.
In this regard, the Treaty distinguishes between public commercial uses and public
non-commercial uses of the patented subject matter. The signatories may allow the
latter without requiring the public agency to first obtain a license with reasonable
commercial terms from the patentee.206
Bill No. 5402/13 reproduces the conditions specified under Article 31 of TRIPS,
but with three deviations.
First, the proposed Article 43A does not provide that the use of the invention
shall predominantly serve the supply of the domestic market, and hence does not
follow Article 31(f) of TRIPS. Second, the provision excludes the existence of a public
interest purpose from judicial review, and hence seems to go beyond Article 31(i) of
TRIPS.
Third, for determining remuneration, the rule makes relevant the
circumstance of whether the patentee cooperated or not with the authority
transferring know-how material for using the invention, and hence, considers
relevant a circumstance which Article 31 of TRIPS does not factor.
The first divergence—the silence over the predominantly domestic destination of
the outcome resulting from the authorized use—is only apparent.
Indeed,
government use is to be granted pursuant to Article 43A only when a public interest
exists. It appears rather straightforward that the public interest, to which the
proposed legislation refers, is the one existing in the patent-granting country.
Because the ordinance, pursuant to Article 43A, must determine the goals for which
the use is to be undertaken, the purpose thereby indicated can be reasonably
assumed to satisfy the specific interest that justifies the enactment of the ordinance,
and therefore fulfills a specific social or technological need within the Brazilian
Federation. Thus, the language of the proposed Article 43A does not indicate per se a
TRIPS violation. Another conclusion is possible if ordinances based on Article 43A—
should the provision be legislated—are adopted to allow public companies to exploit
patented technologies with the purpose of strengthening their competiveness and to
allow them to export in patent-free countries. However, in this case, the use in
question would likely be of a commercial nature within the meaning of Article 31 of
TRIPS. The borders defined by Article 43A would have been crossed anyway.
The prong of the proposed Article 43A that prevents the courts from examining
whether a public interest exists at the basis of the authorization 207 is more

206
207

See TRIPS Agreement, Art. 31(b).
Article 43A § 6, see Bill No. 5402/13, at Art. 3.

[15:150 2016]
Flexibilities under TRIPS:
An Analysis of the Proposal for Reforming Brazilian Patent Law

191

problematic.208 Article 31(1)(i) of TRIPS mandates judicial review of the decision
authorizing the use of the invention and does not admit any exceptions. With respect
to the proposed new Article 43A, one could argue that, for government use, TRIPS
does not require any condition, including that use of or on behalf of the public agency
should be “non-commercial” and “public.” These two requirements apply only when
the government intends to exploit the patented technology without first trying to get
a license on reasonable terms from the patentee. Consequently, a WTO-Member
attempting to make government use dependent upon further conditions—not
requested by TRIPS—while at the same time excluding any legal challenges based on
their alleged absence could be legitimate. Such reasoning is possible, but not
convincing. The TRIPS Agreement has not limited the ability of Member States to
determine the reasons for granting compulsory licenses to private parties, 209 but the
Treaty requires two conditions for the signatories: (1) they must first codify—i.e.,
formally list in a law or decree—the cases in which an unauthorized use may be
allowed (where the law of a Member State allows for other use, TRIPS Article 31(1));
and (2) they must allow judicial review over the validity of the decision granting the
authorization (Article 31(1)(i)).
It would contravene at least TRIPS Article 31(1)(i) to formally allow for such a
review, while at the same time exempting from the inquiry the issue of whether the
legislative reason for the authorization existed in the specific case.210
The last deviance, which implies a lower remuneration for the patentee in cases
in which the patentee does not cooperate or transfer the know-how for practicing the
technology covered by the patent, does not meet significant objections. In cases of
infringement, a possible criterion for determining compensation—recognized by all
208 In the prudent Proposal of Professor Denis Borges Barbosa (see supra note 204), which
inspires Bill No. 5402/13, such limitation to judicial review is absent. The mentioned proposal
provides only that a judgment by the judiciary may not interfere with the public use as long as it did
not become res judicata. Therefore, on the basis of the wording proposed by the Brazilian scholar,
the patentee was entitled to challenge the decision to make public use of the invention with the
argument that no public interest requires such use. On the question whether this limitation of the
judicial review provided in the Bill is consistent with the division of powers under Brazilian
constitutional law, see Marcelo Lauar Leite, Uso nao commercial do objeto ou pedido de patente pelo
estado
brasileiro—Criticas
ao
PL
5402/13,
p.
13
et
seq.,
available
at
http://www.ij.fd.uc.pt/publicacoes_estudos_en.html.
209 See Paragraph 5 of the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement & Public Health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, adopted on November 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration], stating that
“each member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds
upon which such licences are granted.” On the interpretative Status of Doha Declaration under
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties see the analysis by James Thuo Gathii,
The Legal Status of the The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health Under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J. OF L. & TECH., 292 et seq. (2002); see also Max Planck
Inst. for Innovation & Competition, supra note 6.
210 By the same token, the judicial review is possible for the “public” and “not commercial”
character of the use. For the literature, the term “public” can have a double meaning. First, it
“implies a collective purpose, one in the public interest.” Second, it means that the “operation is
carried out, supervised or controlled by a public entity.” See DE CARVALHO, supra note 39, at 406.
Against this background, if the authorized use is of a public nature within the meaning of Article 31
of TRIPS, it will likely serve a public interest as well. If in practice the Courts by teleological
interpretation refrain from examining whether or not the authorized use is public because such
examination would imply assessing the existence of a public interest, then the provision and the
related practice will likely infringe upon Article 31 of TRIPS.
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TRIPS Member States—consists of the reasonable royalties that a voluntary licensee
would have paid for using the patented subject matter. In these cases, even if the
infringer paid exactly the same fees as the hypothetical (or real) volunteer licensee,
the burden for both is not the same. The volunteer licensee usually has an implied
right to assistance and to the transfer of information instrumental to the use of the
invention. The royalty fees practiced in that sector or agreed in the license take into
account these ancillary duties of the patentee. In contrast, the infringer does not
benefit from the assistance of the rights-holder by exploiting the protected
technology.
In the case of a compulsory licensee, the use of the invention is legal and the
licensee is not an infringer. Therefore, it is justifiable to detract from the
remuneration due to the additional costs that incur because of the refusal of the
patentee to transfer information or give necessary or useful instructions for the
exploitation of the claimed technical teaching.
Furthermore, the wording of TRIPS does not require the patentee to be put in
the same condition as if the authorized use had not taken place.211 Such an
interpretation means an implicit restriction for reasons for which the compulsory
license may be granted. Indeed, it would not be possible to use the compulsory
license as a tool to reduce the price of the patented products. 212 A compulsory license
would remain meaningful only in cases in which the patent owner is either unable or
unwilling to satisfy domestic needs. 213 However, such limitations on the possible
reasons for a compulsory license were not agreed upon. 214 Therefore, it would be in
conflict with this understanding of the Agreement, accepted by the Member States, to
derive such a limitation through interpretation of the term “adequate remuneration”
in Article 31 of TRIPS. The wording of the latter provision does not endorse such a
reading. It mandates indeed an “adequate remuneration” that takes into account the
211 But see Martin J. Adelman, Compulsory Licensing of Drugs: TRIPS Context, Paper Presented
at ATRIP Annual Meeting in Tokyo, Japan (Aug 4 2003). According to Adelman:
Thus the TRIPS agreement permits compulsory licensing under conditions
defined in Article 31, but only if the licensee pays a royalty equal to adequate
damages. The actual language of Article 31(h) is the right holder shall be paid
adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the
economic value of the authorization. If these words are taken literally, then
actual damages caused by the grant of a compulsory license is the measure of
adequate remuneration (any other measure is by definition inadequate and
arbitrary). Under such conditions compulsory licensing is only useful when the
patent owner is unwilling or unable to provide a sufficient supply of a needed
patented drug.
Id. at 4. See also Martin J. Adelman, The Role of Patents in the Quest for Affordable Access to Drugs,
Presentation to the World Bank in Washington, D.C. (June 2, 2003).
212 See Samuel Mark Borowski, Saving Tomorrow from Today: Preserving Innovation in the
Face of Compulsory Licensing, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 275, 301 et seq. (2009) (arguing that basing
“adequate remuneration on a lost profits standard as determined by full market value would defeat
the very purpose of compulsory licensing within the TRIPS Regime,” i.e. “promote the public health
through lower medicine costs” because “when royalties are based upon lost profits, no subsequent
price reduction follow.”). See also F.M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, Post-TRIPS Options for Access
to Patented Medicines in Developing Nations, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 913, 921 (2002).
213 This is the conclusion that Professor Adelman draws from the understanding of Article 31 of
TRIPS as mandating a remuneration equivalent to damage award. See Adelman, supra note 211.
214 See supra note 209.
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“economic value of the authorization.” A definition of both terms is lacking in the
Agreement. It seems clear, however, that the terms “adequate remuneration” and
compensation of losses or lost profits are not co-extensive, and that the expression
“value of the authorization” does not refer to the value which the patent or the
compulsorily licensed technology has for the patentee. 215
As long as Article 43A does not sanction the patentee with the loss of any
reasonable compensation in cases in which the patentee refuses to cooperate or
transfer know-how, the rule seems to not only be TRIPS-compliant but even
advisable. It creates an incentive for the rights-holder to assist the public authority
under whose supervision or interest the public use will occur.
VI. PROCEDURAL NORMS
A. Premise
Bill No. 5402/13 provides, inter alia, for two modifications to the patent grant
procedure. First, it intends to adopt a pre-grant opposition system. Second, it
intends to confirm and specify the role of the Agência Nacional de Vigilância
Sanitária (ANVISA) in the examination of the patent applications. While the model
for the first legislative measure is provided by the Indian Patent Act of 1970, to
which the study supporting the reform expressly refers, 216 the role of ANVISA in the
grant procedure is already provided for under Brazilian law. The reform is motivated
by the domestic case law questioning such role.
B. Creation of a Pre-Grant Opposition Procedure
1. Third-Party Participation in the Grant Procedure
The aim of an examination system is to prevent the grant of patents that do not
satisfy the requirements for protection under applicable law. The examiner alone is
not always in a position to guarantee such an outcome. This is particularly true
when the relevant patent act considers any information made accessible to the public
in any language, and in any form anywhere in the world, as prior art capable of being
cited against the invention claimed. Today, this is the rule provided in the vast
majority of patent systems, including those of Europe 217 and Brazil.218
The reasons for these shortcomings in examination are well known. Beyond
human failure, a patent office does not have access to all pieces of information that
215 See Xiuqin Lin, Prior Negotiation and Remuneration for Patent Compulsory Licensing:
Practice, Problem, and Proposal, in COMPULSORY LICENCING—PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES AND WAYS
FORWARD 165, 182 et seq. with further references (Hilty Reto & Kung-Chung Liu eds., 2014).
216 See Ctr. for Strategic Stud. & Debates, supra note 1, at 70, et seq.
217 See EPC, supra note 24, at Art. 54(1)-54(2).
218 See Law No. 9279/96, supra note 2, Art. 11 § 2. In contrast to European law, Brazilian law
provides for a grace period. See id. Art. 12.
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would constitute prior art under such a legislative model. Information published in
writings other than patent applications or articles contained in databases accessible
to the office are rarely available to the examiner. Moreover, prior uses and oral
disclosures can hardly be taken account of in the examination. The same holds true
for some online publications. Even patent literature, if published in languages not
known to the examiner, may be ignored or misunderstood because of the inadequacy
of automatic translations.219 With the growing importance of Asian technical
publications, the purpose of any examination system—to prevent the grant of patents
which turn out to be invalid in revocation procedures—may be better served only
with the cooperation of the public, or, more precisely, with the cooperation of those
entities (not only competitors) operating in the field of the invention.
In this regard, third-party participation in proceedings before the grant
authority serves two complementary purposes. On the one hand, it supplements the
examiner with information not available to or overlooked by him.220 On the other
hand, it shows the office which patents or patent applications really matter to the
public.221 In this way, the system should be capable of not only reducing the
likelihood of patents being granted that later turn out to be invalid, but also of
performing this function while paying specific attention to those patents or patent
applications which competitors consider relevant for their activities.
It is not surprising, therefore, that almost all patent systems providing for a
substantive examination also provide for third-party participation.
From a
diachronic and synchronic perspective, three primary models have been seen so far.
The first one is based on a pre-grant opposition model in which any third party
has the right to challenge the patentability of the invention prior to the grant of the
patent. After the grant, any party—including former, but unsuccessful, opponents—
would be able to initiate a revocation procedure, without res judicata or estoppel
arising from the opposition lodged in the grant procedure. This system was
dominant in examination countries up to the 1980s. Since then, it has gradually
given way to the post-grant opposition model. Today, only a few jurisdictions, among
them Australia222 and Israel,223 contemplate a pre-grant opposition.
The second model is based upon a post-grant opposition procedure. In this
variant, it is possible to file an opposition before the granting authority, but only
after the latter has issued the patent. Before the patent is granted, third parties are
usually entitled to provide the examiner with information and documents, but
219 On the problems surrounding machine translations of prior art, see T 1343/12 of Oct 10,
2014, margin numbers 4.7.8 (unpublished)—Dust adsorbing oil/UNI-CHARM.
220 See Michael A. Carrier, Post-Grant Opposition: A Proposal and a Comparison to the America
Invents Act (September 21, 2011), 45 UC DAVIS LAW REV 103, 116 (2011).
221 With respect to the European opposition system, see Bronwyn H. Hall and Dietmar Harhoff,
Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. Patent System—Design Choices and Expected Impact, 19 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 989, 1006 (2004) (observing that “opposition at the EPO has a screening property:
particularly valuable patents are more likely to be opposed than low value ones”); Mabey, supra note
176, at 232, 268 (noting that “the vast majority of patents are never used, never commercialized,
never asserted, and never challenged” and is therefore likely not relevant for the public). See also
the data quoted by Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1497 (2001) (only 2% of all patents granted are litigated in the United States).
222 On the opposition system in Australia, see the analysis by Kimberlee Weatherall et al.,
Patent Oppositions in Australia: The Facts, 34 UNSW L.J., 93 et seq. (2011).
223 See Patent Law, 5727-1967 (consolidated as of 2014), Articles 3 & 30 (Isr. 1967).
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without a right to be heard. This model is adopted by the EPC224 and was
reintroduced in Japan225 in 2014.
Lastly, the third model is found in Indian law. It combines pre-grant226 and
post-grant227 opposition procedures228 before the patent office with a trial invalidation
procedure before the courts. 229 In the pre-grant as well as post-grant procedures, the
opponent has a right to be heard under Section 25(1) of the India Patent Act of 1970.
While Brazil had a pre-grant opposition system for a long time,230 the law in
force resembles the situation under the EPC. Before the grant, third parties may file
documents with the office without becoming parties to the procedure. 231 After the
grant, they may initiate an administrative procedure for revocation before the
INPI232 and a revocation proceeding before the Federal Courts.233 The reform intends
to create a further option—i.e., the filing of pre-grant opposition. The proposed
provision reads as follows:
Article 31. From the publication of the patent application until the
end of the examination, any interested party may file an opposition.
§ 1 The applicant shall be notified of the opposition through
publication in the official gazette, and may respond within 60 days from the
publication of the opposition.
§ 2 In cases where an opposition to a patent application is filed, the
Brazilian Patent Office may commission technical opinions from the Public
Administration, from organizations recognized by the Government as
consultancy bodies, and from university professors and students.
§ 3 After the opposition is filed, the examiner may, upon justified
demand, apply for any additional clarification he/she deems necessary, as
well as the presentation of supplementary documents.

224
225

2014).

See EPC, supra note 24, Articles 99-105 & 115.
See Act on the Partial Revision of the Patent Act and Other Acts (Act No. 36 of May 14,

See § 25(1), Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005 (India).
See id. § 25(2).
228 On the Indian opposition system, see M.B. RAO & MANJULA GURU, PATENT LAW IN INDIA 176
et seq. (2010); Mueller, supra note 87, at 567 et seq.
229 An even broader model for pre-grant third-party challenges has been adopted by New
Zealand in the Patent Acts 2013, 68/2013, approved on September 13, 2013. According to the new
law, a third party can choose between (i) filing material and observation up to publication of the
acceptance by the examiner; (ii) initiating a pre-grant opposition (Sections 92 of the Patents Act of
2013) within a period of three months from publication of the acceptance; (iii) requesting a
re-examination (Sections 94 and 95 of the Patents Act of 2013) before or after the patent has been
granted. After the patent has been granted, it is further possible to request (iv) a post-grant
re-examination or file (v) a revocation application before the Controller of the Patent Office.
Opposition and revocation are inter partes procedures, pre-grant and post-grant reexamination are
ex parte procedures, since the third party has no right to influence the examination or to be heard by
the Controller.
230 See Ctr. for Strategic Stud. & Debates, supra note 1, at 71, et al.
231 See Law No. 9279/96, supra note 2, Art. 31.
232 See id. Art. 50-51.
233 See id. Art. 56-57.
226
227
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§ 4 The examiner shall mandatorily respond to each filed opposition,
indicating the reason for which he/she accepts or rejects the arguments
presented.
While the content and the impact of the regulation may be analyzed and
predicted only by scholars familiar with the Brazilian prosecution practice, two
remarks—from a European perspective—might nonetheless be stated at this stage.
According to the Report supporting Bill No. 5402/13, the pre-grant opposition
should replace the “input for examination” model—that is, the option to submit
information and documents to the examiner—provided by the current wording of
Article 31 of Law No. 9279/96.234 Such a statement actually does not seem to find
support in Bill No. 5402/13.235 In any case, from a European perspective, the
abolition of the option provided by Article 31 of Law No. 9279/96 in force would be at
odds with the reform’s purpose of increasing the quality of the granted patents by
improving third-party participation in the grant procedure. Under the European
patent system, the right to file information (Article 115 EPC) and the right to file an
opposition (Article 99 EPC) are not deemed functionally equivalent, 236 not only
because the former is available before and after grant. Filing observations under
Article 115 EPC does not incur costs and may be done anonymously. 237 This matters
because entities might be hesitant to challenge the patent where they are the
licensor of the patentee for the same or other patents, or are in anyway contractually
or economically bound to the patentee.238 Third parties—knowledgeable in the field
234 See Ctr. for Strategic Stud. & Debates, supra note 1, at 70 (“thus, we believe that the
replacement of the input to examination institute for the pre-grant opposition institute provided by
law in many countries such as India and China, for instance, can strengthen the participation of
third parties in the process as well as, and most importantly, increase patent quality”).
235 Indeed, a new rule of Bill No. 5402/13 aims at strengthening the third-party participation
system by requiring the INPA to establish “an intuitive electronic channel, of easy access, connected
to the Internet, for any person to present, free of charge, evidence or proof of previous existence, in
Brazil or abroad, of the related invention or state of the art.” This ability of a third person to submit
evidence online is to persist even after the patent has been granted and especially during the
opposition and the “post-grant opposition procedures.” See the proposed Sole Paragraph to Article
31-A, which reads as follows: “It shall be allowed the presentation of evidence or proof of prior
existence, in Brazil or abroad, of the related invention or state of the art, even after a patent is
granted, and especially during the opposition and the post-grant opposition procedures.” With the
term “post-grant procedure” it is meant the administrative revocation procedure provided under
Article 50 et seq. of Law No. 9279/96.
236 See the analysis by Teschemacher, Einwendungen Dritter, Commentary to Article 115 EPC,
margin numbers 1 et seq. in EUROPÄISCHES PATENTÜBEREINKOMMEN (Friedrich K. Beier, et al.,
eds., 2004).
237 On the possibility of filing anonymous third-party observations, see the Decision of the
President of the EPO of May 10, 2011, OJ EPO 2001, at 418; Notice from the EPO, May 11 2011, OJ
EPO 2011, p. 420; on the compatibility of the Decision of the President of the EPO with Article 115
EPC see T 1336/09, Decision of 14 December 2011 (unpublished), margin number No. 2.2.
238 See the following comments by the USPTO in “Changes To Implement the Pre-issuance
Submissions by Third Parties Provision of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act. Final Rule,” 77 FR
137 42150-42174 (July 17, 2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-01-05/pdf/201133811.pdf:
The Office believes that providing anonymity would encourage small-entity third
parties to submit prior art. Without such anonymity, there are situations where
potential small third-party start-ups would be hesitant to make a third-party
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of the invention—might refrain from confronting the owner of the patent applications
with an opposition, but may be willing to exercise the option under Article 115 EPC.
The mechanism under Article 31 of Law No. 9279/96, instead of being abolished,
might be reformed in order to allow anonymously filed observations, something that
is possible in the PCT system,239 but (apparently) not under Brazilian law. 240
Second, what differentiates a grant procedure with third-party participation
from one with pre-grant opposition is that the latter, originally ex parte, after filing of
the opposition becomes inter partes. This is the case, however, only when both
parties are provided with a right to be heard. Such a right, at the moment, does not
seem to be clearly articulated in the reform proposal.
2. TRIPS compliance
In the parliamentary report supporting the reform proposal, it is assumed that
TRIPS is not relevant when it comes to choosing which administrative mechanism
may be provided by the law to third-parties for opposing or revoking the grant of a
patent.241 This understanding of the Treaty is correct as far as the choice of whether
or not third parties may challenge the patentability of the invention or the validity of
the patent is concerned. However, it is not accurate with respect to the effects of the
specific regulation adopted. Three TRIPS provisions are crucial in this context. 242
The first one is laid down in Article 62(1) of TRIPS and reads as follows:
Members may require, as a condition of the acquisition or maintenance
of the intellectual property rights provided for under Sections 2 through 6
of Part. II, compliance with reasonable procedures and formalities. Such
procedures and formalities shall be consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement.
The other provision is encapsulated in Article 62(2) of TRIPS, and reads as follows:
submission, for example in a case in which the third party were concerned with
damaging a valuable relationship with the larger applicant. Anonymity helps
small start-ups in supplying prior art against applications submitted by large
entities (not necessarily competitors) with whom they may have a relationship.
See also Harold C. Wegner, Third Party Submissions: The Final Rule (July 17 2012) (commenting on
the remarks reported above by the Patent Office).
239 See Section 801(1)(i) of the Administrative Instructions under the Patent Cooperation
Treaty, WIPO PCT/AI/14 REV, June 22 2014, according to which “the third party observation
system shall provide a third party with the option to remain anonymous.” This option is provided
only under the Administrative Instructions, and it is not expressly regulated (as well as not
prohibited) by the Treaty and by the Implementing Regulation to the Treaty. Pursuant to Article
89(1) of the PCT Regulations, the Administrative Instructions are valid as long as they are not in
conflict with the provisions of the PCT Treaty and PCT Regulations, or any agreement entered into
by the International Bureau with an International Searching Authority, or an International
Preliminary Examining Authority.
240 See Stéphanie Celaire, Third Party Observations: a weapon to integrate into your IP
strategy?, p. 6 et seq. (2013), at 7, available at http://www.regimbeau.eu/REGIMBEAU/Web/Pages/Ar
ticle.aspx?Language=EN&Article_Id=438.
241 Ctr. for Strategic Stud. & Debates, supra note 1, at 73, et al.
242 See DE CARVALHO, supra note 39, at 667 et seq.; see also Hoss, supra note 180, at 27 et seq.
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Where the acquisition of an intellectual property right is subject to the
right being granted or registered, Members shall ensure that the
procedures for grant or registration, subject to compliance with the
substantive conditions for acquisition of the right, permit the granting or
registration of the right within a reasonable period of time so as to avoid
unwarranted curtailment of the period of protection.
Lastly, Article 62(4) of TRIPS provides that:
Procedures concerning the acquisition or maintenance of intellectual
property rights and, where domestic law provides for such procedures,
administrative revocation and inter partes procedures as opposition,
revocation and cancellation, shall be governed by the general principles set
out in Article 41.2 and Article 41.3.
Of relevance for the present analysis is the former provision referred to by
Article 62(4) TRIPS—i.e., Article 41(2) of TRIPS. This provision requires the
procedures for the enforcement of IP rights under domestic law to be “fair and
equitable,” not “unnecessarily complicated or costly,” and that they not “entail
unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays.” Article 62(4) renders these
principles binding also for the grant, opposition and revocation procedures.
It follows from a contextual reading of all the provisions mentioned that the
procedures for the acquisition and maintenance of IP rights shall: (i) be reasonable
(Article 61(1) of TRIPS); (ii) ensure the granting or registration of the right within a
reasonable period of time (Article 61(2) of TRIPS); and (iii) avoid delays which are
unwarranted (Article 61(4) in conjunction with Article 41(2) of TRIPS). 243
As far as the first requirement is concerned, scholars consider a procedure to be
reasonable within the meaning of Article 62(1) of TRIPS if it is aimed at assessing
whether the claimed subject matter satisfies the requirements for protection which
the Treaty itself expressly mandates or implicitly allows.244
As to the second limitation, the legislature must design the procedure in order to
make the grant possible within a reasonable period of time “so as to avoid
unwarranted curtailment of the period of protection.” It is controversial whether or
not the expression “so as” qualifies the obligation to grant right under a reasonable
period of time under Article 62 of TRIPS. If the expression does not qualify the
obligation,245 a situation where the grant of the patent is not possible within a
See id.
See LAWSON, MALBON & DAVISON, supra note 100, at Art. 62, margin number 62.05 (2014);
Nuno Pires de Carvalho, From the Shaman's Hut to the Patent Office: In Search of a TRIPSConsistent Requirement to Disclose the Origin of Genetic Resources and Prior Informed Consent, 17
WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 111, 125 (2005).
245 See DE CARVALHO, supra note 39, at 671. De Carvalho observes that:
It should be emphasized that paragraph 2 obliges WTO Members to adopt
procedures for grant or registration that permit the acquisition of the rights in a
speedy manner. This is important, because certain WTO Members find it easier
to adopt measures that, being palliative, accord applicants a certain alleviation of
the negative impact of excessive delays, but do not eliminate the delays.
243
244
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reasonable period of time—even if examination is requested—would be in conflict
with Article 62(2) of TRIPS, even if no curtailment of protection resulted from the
delay.246 If the expression, by contrast, qualifies the obligation, then the Member
States comply with Article 62(2) of TRIPS, even if the procedure does not ensure,
upon request by the applicant, that the patent is granted within a reasonable period
of time, provided that a protection sufficient for the TRIPS standard is bestowed on
the applicant.247 The latter interpretation is the more convincing one. From a
textual point of view, it gives an autonomous meaning to the clause introduced by “so
as,” which would otherwise be superfluous. From a teleological point of view, it is
consistent with the purpose of Article 62(2) of TRIPS, which seems to oblige the
Member States to ensure within a reasonable period of time not the formal grant of a
patent as such, but the grant of a legal protection that is consistent with the
standard requested by Article 28 of TRIPS. It does not matter whether this
protection is conferred by granting the patent after examination, by registering it
without examination, or by attributing a jus excludendi before formal grant. TRIPS
does not mandate the manner in which the exclusivity rights are created, but only
their content and their term. For this reason, it is understood that Article 62(2) of
TRIPS prohibits only delays that affect the protection requested.
Against this background, the proposed Article 31 for Law No. 9279/96 involves
the following problem.
An opposition may be filed up to the end of the examination process. The
examination process ends—according to Article 32 of the Normative Instruction
No. 30/2013 of December 4, 2013—on the “date of the conclusive opinion report
regarding patentability, or the thirtieth day prior to the publication of the decision of
acceptance, rejection or definitive shelving, whichever of these is the last to occur.” 248
According to the proposed Article 31 § 4, the “examiner shall mandatorily respond to
each filed opposition, indicating the reason why he or she accepts or rejects the
arguments presented.” Since the regulation proposed allows oppositions during the
whole pendency of the application, the procedure is open to abuse. For example, it is
possible for third parties to file serial and consecutive oppositions for as long as the
final written report has not been issued, requiring the examiner to consider each of
these one at a time. The regulation might therefore give rise to controversy under
Article 62 of TRIPS. On the one hand, it could be challenged as unreasonable under
Article 62(1) of TRIPS. Allowing serial and consecutive oppositions is not necessary
for examining the patentability of an invention. On the other hand, if there is a
delay in the grant, the regulation might be considered one factor contributing to a
situation not consistent with Article 62(2) of TRIPS.

Id.

246 Indeed, no curtailment of protection could result if the published patent application confers
exclusivity rights and the patent applicant may institute infringement action before the issuance of
the patent.
247 See Hoss, supra note 180, at 49 et seq. (seeming to deem the interpretation exposed in the
main text possible).
248 The provision quoted in the text reproduces the wording of Article 7.5 Ato Normativo
127/97—Dispõe sobre a aplicação da Lei de Propriedade Industrial em relação às patentes e
certificados de adição de invenção; see the English translation of the Normative Act 127/97 available
at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=125407.
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These remarks should be considered from the perspective that the reform
intends to eliminate Sole Paragraph of Article 40 of Law No. 9279/96, and that
published applications under Brazilian law do not confer exclusivity rights, and even
do not allow for infringement actions to be lodged before the patent is granted. 249
Furthermore, should the court nevertheless deem the statutory period of limitation
for the indemnification claim under Article 225 of Law No. 9279/96 to commence from
publication of the application and not from grant of the patent,250 the law would
approve the possibility of a curtailment of protection because of the unilateral
behavior of the opponents.
Against this background, two amendments seem to be opportune. A first rule
should provide for the INPI to state an intention to approve the claims and grant the
patent public. A second provision should fix a strict deadline for filing the
opposition—two or three months—starting from the publication of the acceptance of
the patent application. The formal grant would take place only after the expiration
of such deadline or after the filed opposition has been unsuccessful.
This normative model is provided by the laws of Australia, 251 New Zealand,252
and Israel,253 and was in force in Germany254 and the UK255 before these countries,
249 Indeed according to Article 44 of Law No. 9279/96 it is the patent proprietor and not the
owner of the patent application that has the right to obtain a compensation for the use of the
invention occurred after the publication of the patent application. From this provision the
scholarship and the case law infer that the right to obtain the compensation comes to existence with
the grant of the patent, but it has a retroactive application; see Denis Borges Barbosa, A inexplicável
política pública por trás do parágrafo único, do art. 40, da Lei de Propriedade Industrial,
http://www.denisbarbosa.addr.com/arquivos/200/propriedade/inexplicavel_politica_publica.pdf (last
visited February 8, 2015), at 33 et seq.
250 The issue does not seem to have been clarified in the case law of the state courts so far. See
Fernando Eid Philipp & Guilherme Toshihiro Takeishi, supra note 172, at 42 et seq. According to
these two authors, the statute of limitations should not commence before the grant of the patent
since the patentee is not in a position to exercise the right. For this reason, Article 199(1) of the
Brazilian Civil Code applies, according to which the statute of limitations does not run “pendendo
condicao suspensiva.” As both authors reported in the cited paper, this issue has yet to be settled by
the Brazilian courts.
251 In Australia, the opposition is to be lodged at the patent office “within three months from the
day the notice of acceptance is published” in the Australian Official Journal of Patents. See § 59
Patents Act of 1990; Reg. 5.4 Patent Regulations (1991). See also Weatherall et al., supra note 222,
at 95 et seq.
252 On the situation in New Zealand, see supra note 229.
253 In Israel, when the application has been accepted under Section 26 of Patent Act
No. 5727-1967, the Registrar shall publish the fact of acceptance online. Pursuant to Section 30 of
the Patent Act, “any person may—within three months after the date of publication of the
application under section 26—oppose the grant of a patent by written notice to the Registrar” (the
quoted translation of the Act is available at www.wipo.org). On pre-grant opposition under Israeli
law, see ERAN LISS & DAN ADIN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE IN ISRAEL 73 et seq.
(2012); ORIT FISCHMAN AFORI ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN ISRAEL 104 et seq. (2013).
254 See Section 24 of the Patent Act (Patentgesetz) of April 7, 1891.
On the historical
development of the opposition system in Germany, see CHRISTIAN HAUGG, DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES
EINSPRUCHSVERFAHRENS IM DEUTSCHEN UND EUROPÄISCHEN PATENTRECHT 16 et seq. (2000).
255 See Section 11 of the Patent and Designs Act of 1907, pursuant to which “any third party
within a period of two months from the date of the advertisement of the acceptance by a patent office
of the complete specification may give notice at the patent office of opposition to the grant of the
patent.” The comptroller was required to advertise the acceptance of the patent, and from that date
the application was to be open to the public for inspection pursuant to Section 9 of the Act.
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influenced by the EPC,256 adopted a post-grant opposition. It has a clear advantage.
The strict deadline for filing the opposition prevents serial and consecutive
oppositions aimed at delaying the examination. It moreover reduces the room for
challenging the regulation as unreasonable under Article 62(1) of TRIPS.
Admittedly, delays resulting from examination of the prior art found by the examiner
or submitted by an opponent remain possible and likely. However, this fundamental
problem exists in Brazil just as in other countries regardless of whether or not a
pre-grant opposition procedure is available. 257 While it is not the purpose of this
article to focus on this issue, it is questionable whether a mere change in domestic
provisions (beyond moving to a pure registration system) 258 could really resolve it.
Nevertheless, the legislature could at least remove factors contributing to the
backlogs of the INPI that are purely home-grown. For example, one peculiarity of the
Brazilian system is that utility models undergo a full examination on their merits. It
is worth considering whether this legislation might be reformed so as to ease the
burden on the INPI.
The following cumulative measures are possible. The legislature could first
extend utility model protection to all product inventions. Second, it could shift the
utility system from an examination model to one in which there is no examination of
novelty and inventive activity—such as in Italy, or China259—or is optional—such as
in Australia260, Japan261 and Portugal,262—or in which only a prior art search report
must or may be issued—such as in Austria263 and Germany,264 respectively. Lastly,
256 See Kurt Härtel, Die Entwürfe der Übereinkommen über ein europäisches System der
Erteilung von Patenten und über ein Patent für den Gemeinsamen Markt, Gewerblicher
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht – Internationaler Teil [GRUR Int.], pp. 95, 99 (1970).
257 See also Barbosa, supra note 249; Hoss, supra note 180, at 49.
258 See the analysis and the proposal in the U.S. context by F. Scott Kieff, The Case for
Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV.
55 (2003).
259 In China (as in Italy), the National Patent Office SIPO examines only the absolute grounds
for non-eligibility (i.e., grounds whose existence does not depend on the content of the prior art, as to
whether the claimed subject matter is eligible for protection—process and chemical compounds are
excluded from utility models—or whether the exclusion for immoral inventions applies). The SIPO
does not carry out a search of the prior art, and does not examine novelty and non-obviousness; for
details, see T. Mak, Utility Models, in PATENT LAW IN GREATER CHINA 369 et seq. (Stefan
Luginbuehl & Peter Ganea eds., 2014).
260 Innovation patents are granted without examination. The examination is necessary if the
owner of the patent wants to institute an infringement proceeding; see Advisory Council on
Intellectual Property (ACIP), Review of the Innovation Patent System—Final Report, p. 3 et seq.
(May 2014). According to this report, the absence of an examination is a cause of uncertainty, and
therefore the Committee proposes to introduce such examination to be requested by the applicant
three years from filing.
261 Pursuant to Article 12, 29bis and 29ter of Utility Model Act n. 123 1959 any person may
request a technical opinion over the registrability of the subject matter claimed in a pending
application or over the validity of a registered utility model. The opinion does not bind the judge, if
it is referred to a registered utility model, and does not bind the Patent Office, if it is referred to a
pending application.
262 See Article 131 of the Industrial Property Code (IPC), pursuant to which the examination
may be requested before the grant (Article 131.1 of the IPC) and must be requested after the grant if
the owner intends to start an infringement proceeding (Article 131.3 of the IPC).
263 See Gebrauchsmustergesetz (last amendment BGB1. I. Nr. 126/2009) (Utility Model Act)
§ 27 (Austria 1994).
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the INPI could raise fees for patent applications that undergo examination and lower
them for utility models granted without examination. These measures would likely
free up resources which could then be allocated to the prosecution of patent
applications.
The additional option created in this way—utility models without full and
mandatory examination—would mostly benefit domestic applicants, as experience in
China and elsewhere suggests.
3. Practical Aspects
Should Bill No. 5402/13 be enacted into law, competitors will have five possible
ways to challenge either the patentability of an invention filed with, or the validity of
a patent granted by, the INPI:
(1) submitting data and information pursuant to Article 31 of Law No. 9279/96;
(2) filing a pre-grant opposition;
(3) instituting nullity proceeding before the INPI within a period of six months
from the patent grant (Article 51 of Law No. 9279/96);
(4) proposing judicial nullity proceedings during the life of the patent before the
Federal Court (Article 57 of Law No. 9279/96);
(5) raising an invalidity defense before the state courts in the infringement
proceeding instituted by the patentee (Article 56 § 1 of Law No. 9279/96). 265
264 Pursuant to Section 7 of the German Utility Model Act (Gebrauchsmustergesetz), the patent
office is required, upon request, to perform a search of the prior art which is relevant for “assessing
the registrability of the subject matter of the utility model application or the utility model”; see
English translation of Utility Model Act (as amended September 2, 1994) available under
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=126190. Such “a request may be filed by the
applicant or the registered proprietor or by any other party” before or after the registration in the
utility model register; see Section 7 (2) of the Act.
265 In Brazil, the State courts have jurisdiction over infringement actions, whereas the Federal
courts have jurisdiction over actions for the revocation of the patent, see Article 57 of Law No. 9279.
The INPI shall participate in the revocation proceedings when it is not the plaintiff. As a
consequence, the defendant in an infringement action can not file a counterclaim for revocation of
the asserted patent before the State court sued by the patentee. Indeed the defendant in this case
should add to the counterclaim the INPI, since the latter is a necessary joint defender in any
revocation action. But this is not possible under current procedural law according to Brazilian
scholars. However, according to the aforementioned Article 56 § 1 of Law No. 9279/96, “the nullity
of a patent may be argued at any time as a matter of defense.” This provision for a long time was
understood as allowing the defendant to contest the validity of the patent as a defense with effect
inter partes in any infringement proceeding pending before a State court. However, the case law
now seems to reject this interpretation. The Superior Court of Justice, in a decision of 13 March
2012 concerning design rights, but relevant also for patents, interpreted the rule as only allowing
the defendant in an infringement proceeding to start a revocation proceeding—pending the
infringement action—before the Federal courts. See Superior Tribunal de Justiça, RE no. 1.132.449
- PR (2009/0062354-4). By contrast, this judgment does not allow the question of invalidity to be
raised as a defense against an infringement action before the State court. If this judgment becomes
established case law, the Brazilian system will practically adopt a principle of separation as
provided under German law. On this point and for the analysis of the case law I refer to the
contribution of Filipe Fischmann, PATENT ENFORCEMENT IN BRAZIL, in CRISTOPHER HEATH (ed.),
PATENT ENFORCEEMENT WORLDWIDE—WRITINGS IN HONOUR OF DIETER STAUDER, 3 ed., 2015, 516,
530 et seq.
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Bill No. 5402/13 is silent on the relationship among the different procedures. In
particular, it does not address the issue of whether the same party remains entitled
to initiate a trial invalidation procedure even if this procedure is based on the same
invalidity grounds already invoked in a previous administrative pre-grant (or postgrant) inter partes procedure. The functionality of the system should require that no
opponent should suffer drawbacks in subsequent litigation as a result of having
challenged the patentability of the invention in the pre-grant-procedure.
C. Role of ANVISA in the Patent Grant Procedure
1. Scope of ANVISA’s Prior Consent
The role of ANVISA in the Brazilian patent grant procedure is provided for
under Article 229-C of the Law No. 9279/96. The rule, introduced in 2001, 266 makes
the grant of “patents for pharmaceutical products and processes” dependent “on the
prior consent of the National Health Agency—ANVISA.”
The provision does not stipulate which aspects should be addressed by
examination by the Health Agency, or the reasons why approval may be denied. This
loophole has given rise to controversy before the Brazilian courts. 267 The reform
would remove this uncertainty by restating Article 229-C as follows:
Article 229-C. The granting of patents for pharmaceutical products
and processes shall depend on the prior consent from the National Health
Agency—ANVISA, which shall examine the object subject to the patent
application in light of public health.
§ 1 A patent application shall be considered contrary to public health,
according to further regulation, where:
I—the product or pharmaceutical process in the patent application
presents a health risk; or
II—the patent application for a pharmaceutical product or
pharmaceutical process is of interest to an access-to-medicines policy or to a
pharmaceutical care program under the National Health System—SUS,
and provided that it does not meet the patentability requirements and the
other criteria established by this law.
§ 2 Following the prior consent examination and after the decision is
published, ANVISA shall return the application to the Patent Office, which
shall examine the approved application, and definitively archive the
application that has not been approved.

266 See Law No. 9279/96, supra note 2, amended by Law No. 10196 February 14, 2001
[hereinafter Law No. 10196/2001]; see also Viviane Yumy Mitsuuchi Kunisawa, Patenting
Pharmaceutical Inventions on Second Medical Uses in Brazil, 12 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 297, 298
(2009); L.L. Mueller & Costa Taketsuma, Should ANVISA Be Permitted to Reject Pharmaceutical
Patent Applications in Brazil? 24 EXPERT OPINION ON THERAPEUTIC PAT. 1 et seq. (2014).
267 See BASSO ET AL., supra note 203, at 79 with reference to diverging decisions over the reach
of ANVISA competence: see also KUNISAWA, supra note 11, at 105 et seq.

[15:150 2016] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

204

According to the amendment, the patent application still has to be filed with the
INPI, but the substantive examination is to be performed by ANVISA first. If
ANVISA deems the invention to be patentable, this opinion does not prevent the
INPI from carrying out a second substantive examination and rejecting the
application. Conversely, if ANVISA denies patentability, the INPI is bound by this
opinion.
2. TRIPS Compliance
The role of ANVISA has already been challenged from the standpoint of the
TRIPS Agreement. The provisions of Bill No. 5402/13 confirming this function of the
agency will likely face similar objections. So far, there are two arguments that have
been brought forward.
The first is that the regulation mandating the prior approval of the Health
Agency does not comply with the prohibition of discrimination provided under
Article 27(1) of TRIPS.268 As a result of this mechanism, some inventions are subject
to dual examination while others are not. 269
The second argument is that the involvement of an external agency for
examining health risks and the resulting delay in the grant procedure is not
reasonable pursuant to Article 62(1) of TRIPS.270 The grant of the patent does not
give the right to use the invention under Article 27 of TRIPS, and therefore does not
justify assessing the health risks resulting from the marketing of the invention.
As far as the prohibition of discrimination under Article 27(1) of TRIPS is
concerned, the attack is unconvincing for two reasons. First, the prohibition of
discrimination does not apply to inventions for which a protection may be outright
denied because of an optional exception to patentability under Article 27(2) or 27(3)
of TRIPS. Indeed, the power to exclude any protection for a specific subject matter—
provided by Article 27(3) of TRIPS—includes the ability to admit a lesser protection
than that required by Article 28 of TRIPS for the other inventions, or an equivalent
protection but one subject to conditions in addition to those generally requested for
the other inventions.271 The use of a known compound for the treatment of a disease
is a medical method within the meaning of Article 27(3) of TRIPS.272 Therefore, it

268 See Pharm. Res. & Mfrs. of Am. (PhRMA), Special 301 Submission, 101 (2009) (observing,
with regard to ANVISA intervention in the grant procedure: “This dual examination is incompatible
with Brazil‘s obligations under the antidiscrimination provisions of Article 27.1 of the World Trade
Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).”). The
same opinion may be found in Innovative Pharm. Ass’n of S. Afr. (IPASA), Comments on the Draft
National Policy on IP, 15 (Oct 2013), available at http://ipasa.co.za/.; L.L. Mueller & Costa
Taketsuma, supra note 266, at 3.
269 See Kunisawa, supra note 266, at 305 (specifically with respect to second medical use
claims); KUNISAWA, supra note 11, at 118.
270 See Hoss, supra note 180, at 26 et seq.
271 This is the argument by Thomas, invoking the maxim “the greater includes the less” by
addressing the issue whether or not the limitation to the enforceability of medical-methods patents
complies with Article 27(1) of TRIPS. See John R. Thomas, Symposium: The Post-Industrial Patent
System, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 3, 49 (1999).
272 See supra Part III, Paragraph B (3) of this article.
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may be made subject to procedural or substantive conditions possibly not admitted by
Article 27(1) of TRIPS.
As for new chemical entities and processes for their manufacture, the situation
is prima facie different. This category of subject matter may not be excluded from
patent protection under Article 27(3) of TRIPS. However, as pointed out in the
literature273 and in WTO case law,274 Article 27(1) of TRIPS does not prohibit
differentiation in cases where objective grounds for them exist. If it can be
reasonably argued that the participation of ANVISA in the grant procedure in the
field of pharmaceutical inventions is necessary, because only this agency—in the
specific administrative structure of the Brazilian State275—has the technical
competence or the specific legal skills required to examine all or some of the
requirements for protection in that field, 276 the differential treatment might be
defended before a WTO panel as justified. This consideration might be valid
provided that the examination performed by ANVISA concerns prerequisites for
patentability which TRIPS mandates or allows.
This brings us to the second point, namely what the subject of the examination
of ANVISA should be from a TRIPS perspective in order to be reasonable within the
meaning of Article 62(1) of TRIPS.
Under Article 27 of TRIPS, the patent applicant has a right to the grant of the
patent. If the requirements for protection are met and no exception applies, the
patent has to be issued. Any regulation affording room to exercise discretion in this
respect would be inconsistent with the principles set out in Article 27(1) of TRIPS. 277
According to some scholars, it would further challenge the principle of legacy
governing administrative actions enshrined in several constitutions, which would
likely include the Brazilian constitution. 278
Bill No. 5402/13 is consistent with these premises. According to the proposed
Article 229-C § 1 ANVISA may not deny its approval when the patentability
requirements are satisfied and the invention is not dangerous to health. No
discretionary power is granted to the administrative authority. Because TRIPS does
not mandate the Member States to entrust only their patent offices with the
273 See Max Planck Inst. for Innovation & Competition, supra note 6, at 688;
Graeme B.
Dinwoodie and Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without Discriminating: Complying with the
Mandates of the TRIPS Agreement, 13 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 445, 450 et seq. (2007).
274 See Canada–Patent Protection pf Pharmaceutical Products, Report of the Panel WT/DS114/5
(circulated November 12, 1998), 7.94.
275 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, Art. 1(1).
276 As reported by De Carvalho, the Brazilian representatives during the Trade Policy Review of
Brazil in 2000 already argued that the requirement of the prior approval by ANVISA was lawful
under Article 1 and Article 8 of TRIPS, maintaining that “INPI may lack the expertise to examine
all the complex technological elements involved in pharmaceutical inventions,” and that therefore
“ANVISA’s approval may contribute to ensure a more expeditious approval of pharmaceutical
patents.” DE CARVALHO, supra note 39, at 79; WT/TPR/M/75 of Dec 6 2000, ¶ 65-66 (quoted again
after De Carvalho).
277 Under TRIPS, more precisely, patents are private rights whose grant or bestowal is not
subject to the exercise of a case-specific political discretion of the competent authority. See TRIPS
Agreement, see supra note 5, Preamble (stating that the Member States recognize IP rights as
private rights).
278 See Denis Borges Barbosa, A Incostitucionalidade da anuência da ANVISA no procedimento
de concessão de patentes como manifestação discricionária da Aministração Federal,
http://denisbarbosa.addr.com/papelanvisa.pdf. (last access December 2014).
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examination,279 and because other countries allow consultation of external agencies
in the prosecution of all or specific applications, 280 the role attributed to ANVISA
does not per se contravene any obligation under WTO law as far as the examination
of the patentability requirements is concerned.
The legal assessment is more complex when it comes to the competence of
ANVISA to deny approval in case of health risks provided by the first prong of the
provision.281 According to the comments of the parliamentary report supporting the
reform, this rule should call for a refusal of the application only when the product has
been previously rejected by ANVISA. 282 A resolution of ANVISA, which concerns the
operation of Article 229-C of Law No. 9279/96 in force, stipulates that a patent
application is contrary to public health only when it concerns a substance whose
exploitation is already prohibited under Brazilian law. 283
If the latter means that the grant of the patent is prevented only when the
exploitation of the substance used or manufactured by the invention is absolutely
prohibited—and not merely unauthorized—and if that is the meaning underlying the
expressions used by the proposed Article 229-C, then the first prong of the provision
will not really be relevant.284 Further, it will not meet with serious concerns from the
perspective of international law. If the commercial exploitation of the substance used

See DE CARVALHO, supra note 39, at 285.
As far as biotechnological inventions are concerned, the patent offices in Italy and Norway
are entitled to request the opinion of external agencies on questions relating to patentability. In
Norway, pursuant to Section 15a of the Patent Act (Act no. 9 of December 15, 1967 on patents), if
the Industrial Property Office “is in doubt whether a patent should be granted or refused based on
Section 1b” then it “shall obtain an advisory statement from an ethics committee appointed by the
King.” See translation of the Patent Act, available at https://www.patentstyret.no. Section 1b of the
Norwegian Patent Act excludes patentability for inventions whose commercial exploitation is in
conflict with public policy or morality. In Italy, pursuant to Article 170bis of the code of industrial
property (cpi), the Patent and Trade Mark Office may consult the Comitato Nazionale per la
Biosicurezza, le Biotecnologie e le Scienze della Vita (CNBBS). While in Norway the Ethical
Committee should advise only in the case of doubts related to the applicability of the exclusion based
on ordre public and morality, in Italy the CNBBS may be requested to issue an opinion on any issue
related to patentability. Otherwise, the Norwegian Patent Office may consult the Ethical
Committee on any invention to which Section 1b of the Patent Act might apply. By contrast, the
Italian Patent and Trade Mark Office may resort to the CNBSS only in cases of biotechnological
inventions as defined by Article 2 of the Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological
inventions, 98/44 CE. According to the Italian scholars, since Article 170bis cpi confers the ability
but not the obligation to consult the CNBSS, the opinion of the latter would not bind the Patent
Office. On Section 15a of the Norwegian Patent Act, see Kaja Veel Midtbø, Amendments to the
Norwegian Patents Act—Implementation of Directive 98/44/EC, INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 542, 544 (2005), and on article 170bis of the Italian code of Industrial Property, see
Anna Colmano, Commentary on Article 170 bis cpi, in CODICE DELLA PROPRIETÀ INDUSTRIALE, at
1590 et seq. (Adriano Vanzetti ed., 2014).
281 See Article 229-C § 1 I as redrafted by the Bill No. 5402/2013.
282 Ctr. for Strategic Stud. & Debates, supra note 1, at 14.
283 See Resolution No. 21, §§ 1-2 (Apr 10, 2013).
284 According to the data published by the Center for Strategic Studies and Debates, ANVISA
has denied its prior approval between 2001 and 2009 to 119 patent applications out of 1,346
forwarded by the INPI (denial rate of about 9%). Based on the data reported by the study, none of
the patent applications were rejected because of a risk to public health. The main reasons were,
instead, lack of novelty or inventive step (72.6% of cases), insufficient disclosure (16%), and
exception for natural products (5.9%). See Ctr. for Strategic Stud. & Debates, supra note 1, at 262.
279
280
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or produced by the claimed invention is prohibited, without exception, Article 27(2) of
TRIPS allows patentability of the claimed technical solution to be prohibited as well.
Another conclusion is possible, by contrast, if the provision is interpreted as
meaning that the Agency should examine the safety of the drug and deny the
patentability if such safety is not proven under regulatory standards.
The wording of the proposed Article 229C § 1 does not exclude such an
understanding.285 An exclusion thus made and applied in this way would go beyond
Article 27(2) of TRIPS. The latter refers indeed to inventions whose commercial
exploitation is contrary to the fundamental principle of the legal system of the
WTO-Members,286 and is therefore in conflict with provisions embodying some
fundamental values—provisions that usually do not admit any exception. Provisions,
such as those concerning the approval of drugs which prohibit the commercial
exploitation of a product only in the absence of an authorization by the competent
authority, are not considered norms capable of excluding patentability within the
meaning of Article 27(2) of TRIPS 287 and Article 4quater of the Paris Convention.288
Against this background, if ANVISA were to exclude inventions based on the same
criteria which it would apply to deny a market authorization, this could turn out to
be problematic under WTO law.289
Historically, several legal systems actually did make the grant of a patent
conditional upon the safety of the invention. In Italy, if the Patent Office held that
the invention might be harmful to health, it had to ask—up until 1979—the Public
Health Agency for an opinion.290 If the latter concluded that the invention was
harmful, the Patent Office had to reject the patent application. 291
285 The interpretation assumed in the text, while allowed by the proposed wording, seems to be
clearly rejected by the Report supporting Bill No. 5402/13, see Ctr. for Strategic Stud. & Debates,
supra note 1, at 14 (stating that one of the purpose of the reform is to grant ANVISA “the duty to
analyze, prior to the Patent Office, patent applications involving pharmaceutical/chemical i)
products that have previously been rejected by the Agency, and thus present health risks . . . .”
286 See Straus, supra note 5, at 182; see also Rainer Moufang, Patenting of Human Genes, Cells
and Parts of the Body?—The Ethical Dimensions of Patent Law, 25 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 487, 503 et seq. (1994).
287 See also THIERRY CALAME, ÖFFENTLICHE ORDNUNG UND GUTE SITTEN ALS SCHRANKEN DER
PATENTIERBARKEIT GENTECHNOLOGISCHER ERFINDUNGEN, at 134 (Basel et al. eds., 2001).
288 According to Article 4quater of the Paris Convention (1967), the grant of a patent shall not
be refused on the ground that the sale of the patented product is subject to restriction or limitations
resulting from domestic law.
289 One way to defend the domestic situation might be to invoke the requirement for industrial
applicability or utility. It might be argued that an invention that gives rise to a health risk or is not
proven to be safe cannot be industrially applicable or useful within the meaning of Article 27(1) of
TRIPS. However, such a reading of the requirement would be at odds with Article 27(2) of TRIPS,
more specifically with the clarification contained therein that an invention does not contravene
public policy and morality only because the exploitation is prohibited by statutory law. The latter
condition would be obsolete if a Member State, in the case of a sales ban for products incorporating
the invention, had sufficient grounds to exclude patent protection on the basis of the utility
requirement. See CALAME, supra note 287, at 66.
290 See Royal Decree 1127/1932, Art. 32. This provision was abolished in 1979.
291 On the binding character of the Health Agency opinions for the Patent Office, see Corte di
Cassazione (Supreme Court), Sezioni Unite, April 15 1939 no. 1217, Naturin Werke v. Ministero
corporazioni, Il Foro italiano, Rep. 1989, Privative ind., no. 39; Corte di Cassazione, Sezioni unite,
August 1 1942, no. 2312; Soc. Schering v. Ministero Corporazioni, Il Foro Italiano, Vol. 68, I, 1943, p.
217 ff.
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In the U.S., some inventions were excluded from patent protection for lack of
utility when they were held to be dangerous for human health. 292 The reason cited
for this practice was, inter alia, that the patent grant might be misunderstood as
proof of the safety and functioning of the patented technology. The risk of such a
misunderstanding was said to be particularly serious in the pharmaceutical field and
therefore had to be prevented.293
Gradually, though, all these systems came to reject safety as a criterion for
patentability.294 Three reasons were mentioned for this development.
First, the examination of an invention’s safety requires time and skill. The
delay and costs caused by the examination would be disproportionate to any benefit
gained. The grant of the patent does not authorize the use of patented technology,
and, conversely, the refusal of the application does not prevent its exploitation. 295
Second, the specification of a patent application does not contain the data
necessary to assess whether or not the invention is safe. The information needed, in
the case of pharmaceuticals, usually does not become available during the
prosecution but only several years after the examination has begun.296

292 See In re Application of William C. Anthony, 414 F.2d 1383, 1398-99 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (with
references to prior decisions). See also CALAME, supra note 287, at 108.
293 See Isenstead v. Watson, 157 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1957). The risk that the patent grant might
be understood as imprimatur was also one of the reasons brought by the former Sub-Alpine
Parliament in Italy to exclude the patentability of pharmaceutical inventions.
See Corte
Costituzionale, Decision of 9. March1978, INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 1979, 246—
“Pharmaceuticals.”
294 See CALAME, supra note 287, at 108.
295 See In re Application of William L. Hartop, Jr., 311 F.2d 249 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (where the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals observed: “It is an elemental principle of patent law that a
patent grants no more than the legal right to exclude others from making, using or selling the thing
patented. It is no guarantee of anything and gives no one a right to make, use or sell anything. The
public, therefore, is in no way protected either by the granting or withholding of a patent.”). See also
CALAME, supra note 287, at 108 et seq.
296 See the remarks of the Board of Appeal of the EPO in T 0356/93, Decision of 21 February
1995, OJ EPO 1995, 545, Reasons for the decision no. 18.4—Plant cells/PLANT GENETIC
SYSTEMS:
In most cases, potential risks in relation to the exploitation of a given invention
for which a patent has been granted cannot be anticipated merely on the basis of
the disclosure of the invention in the patent specification. Typical examples are
patents granted for chemical compounds with a pharmaceutical use. In this
particular technical field, patents are generally granted on the basis of
preliminary in vitro or animal data before any human clinical data become
available. In fact, the actual approval (or disapproval) by the competent
authorities of the exploitation of pharmaceutical products is often obtained only
after the grant of the patent. This is because a realistic assessment of
therapeutical operability requires a comprehensive and time-consuming
programme of testing and evaluation of the products. The results of such tests
are usually not available to patent offices during the prosecution of a case.
During this time, the exploitation of the claimed products is most likely to be in
the initial phase when risk and safety assessment by the competent authorities or
bodies has either not yet taken place or not yet been completed. The same holds
true for many other products the exploitation of which is subject to approval by
the competent authorities or bodies, such as herbicides, insecticides, etc. These
specialised authorities and bodies are in a position to carry out a realistic
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Third, the purpose of a patent system is to stimulate “the investment of
additional capital needed for the further development and marketing of the
invention.”297 For this reason, the rejection of a patent application on the grounds
that further research is necessary to prove that the invention is safe and ready for
marketing “would effectively defeat that objective of the patent system.” 298
Even in Europe, where the patent system is not morally neutral, 299 safety is not
a general criterion for patentability. Absence of its proof and doubts as to its
existence—save exceptional cases—do not prevent the patent from being granted.
It is likely that not all the arguments cited against an assessment in the grant
procedure of whether the invention is safe are cogent. 300 Nevertheless, the Brazilian
legislature could take account of these experiences in Europe and in the U.S., and
consider whether the concerns being voiced there against safety control through the
national or regional patent offices are also relevant for the Brazilian context.
3. Some Practical Considerations
The dual examination prescribed by Bill No. 5402/13 might lead to additional
delays in the procedures by the INPI. Since Brazilian law does not contemplate
supplementary certificates of protection for pharmaceutical inventions, and since
Article 40, Sole Paragraph of Law No. 9279/96 should be abolished, the reformer
ought to consider whether alternative measures—providing for the requested role of
ANVISA, but avoiding a duplication of procedures—are possible. One way to
simplify the situation might be to entrust only one agency with examination of the
patent applications. For this purpose, a patent department consisting of officials
from both authorities could be established by INPI or by ANVISA. While the INPI
might receive and formally review the application, this patent department would
then be the only entity to conduct the substantive examination. Based on the
outcome of the examination, the INPI could formally grant the patent or reject the
application.
The reform might pave the way for such cooperation. The main reason why the
intervention of ANVISA is controversial in Brazil seems to be—beyond the delays

Id.

assessment of risks or even hazards on the basis of the regulations in force, of
objective criteria and of scientifically valid parameters.

297 In re Anthony, 414 F.2d at 1383 (C.C.P.A. 1969), (quoting REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 'S
COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF THE USEFUL ARTS, S. Doc.
No. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)); CALAME, supra note 287, at 109.
298 Id.
299 See Article 53(a) EPC and Article 6 of the Directive on the Protection of Biotechnological
Inventions, 98/44 CE, Official Journal L 213, July 30, 1998, p. 13. Patents have been denied and
patent claims have been objected in the practice of the EPO because of moral concerns related to
commercial exploitation of the subject matter claimed. See T 0866/01, Decision of 11 May 2005,
unpublished—Euthanasia Compositions/Mich. St. Univ.).
300 For instance, the mere fact that the patent does not confer the right to use the invention is
not sufficient to reject any position advocating an indirect regulatory function of the patent system.
Indeed such an argument might be used against the exclusion based on the ordre public and
morality as well, which, by contrast, is adopted by the EU Member States and is admitted by TRIPS;
see CALAME, supra note 287, at 166.
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caused in the prosecution—the different approach to patentability adopted by the
Health Agency. More precisely, while the INPI considers patent claims for new uses
and derivatives admissible in principle, ANVISA does not. 301 Since the reform is
intended to legislate in this field—irrespective of the content of the provisions that
are finally enacted—it will likely limit the scope for divergent interpretations. As
already observed in the literature,302 India entrusts the examination of Section 3(d)
of the Patent Act of 1970 to the Patent Office and not to the Central Drugs Standard
Control Organization, the Indian counterpart to ANVISA. This apparently has not
affected the relevance of the patent exclusion in practice.
VII. FINAL REMARKS: THE ISSUE OF USE CLAIMS
It has been suggested that the shift in global economic power might affect the
norm-setting process within the WTO system. According to this theory, emerging
countries, formerly passive rule-takers, will increasingly experiment with innovative
regulatory frameworks.303 Bill No. 5402/13, if enacted with the current wording,
would be in line with this prediction. At the same time, the passage of Bill
No. 5402/13 would deepen the existing division in the patent policy of the emerging
economies.
On one side of the divide stand China and other countries who share
Western-level patent protection standards, an effective utility model system, and an
understanding of IP rights as strategic weapons which nationals are encouraged to
accumulate at home and abroad. On the other side are India and Brazil, both with a
more critical attitude towards patents, 304 the absence of utility models granted
without examination,305 and skepticism about the ability of domestic actors to
compete against foreign companies in acquiring relevant IP assets. 306
In comparison to existing research on these political aspects of lawmaking
within and beyond the WTO system, the purpose of this paper was by far more
modest. It intended to show that the TRIPS Agreement, with some reservations,
leaves sufficient room for adopting the Proposal for reform. Admittedly, it would be
inaccurate to assume that the Member States are completely free under WTO law to
set an autonomous standard of patentability and design the granting procedure.
TRIPS, however, allows for denial of product protection for structurally obvious

301 See Kunisawa, supra note 266, at 299 et seq.; Mueller & Taketsuma, supra note 266, at 1
et seq.; Kenneth C. Shadlen, The Political Contradictions of Incremental Innovation: Lessons from
Pharmaceutical Patent Examination in Brazil, 39 POL. & SOC’Y 143, 154 (2011).
302 See Shadlen, supra note 152, at 158.
303 See Susan K. Sell, The geo-politics of the world patent order, in EMERGING MARKETS AND THE
WORLD PATENT ORDER 46, 47 (Frederick M. Abbott et al. eds., 2013).
304 The most visible legislative signs of this are limitations to patent-eligible subject matter,
local working requirements, an effective compulsory license regime, and the existence of multiple
options for preventing or removing the grant of a patent even at the cost of efficiency.
305 India does not provide for utility model protection.
Brazil, as mentioned in the paper,
provides for utility models, but subjects their issue to a full examination.
306 See Ctr. for Strategic Stud. & Debates, supra note 1, at 42 et seq.
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compounds, even if these have unexpected properties. 307 It permits denial of
protection for medical uses of known compounds, even if they are novel and
inventive. It does not limit the reasons for granting compulsory licenses. 308 Also, it
finally allows the Member States to provide third parties with multiple options for
preventing and removing granted patents. 309
Whether or not making use of all the mentioned options constitutes good policy
is an entirely separate question. The uncertainty surrounding the effects of the
patent system prevents the author from even speculating whether the Chinese model
or the Indian approach would work better for Brazil or other countries. But it is
possible that the effects of the national patent system—in promoting or hindering
domestic development—are overstated. The size of the markets, the regulatory
environments, the infrastructures, and the efficiency of the administration are likely
far more influential factors in attracting or deterring investments. Furthermore,
global trade has grown significantly in the last thirty years. No national patent
system—beyond those of the EU, China, and the U.S.—can likely claim to be
controlling the decisions in research and development of domestic actors.
Nevertheless, national markets, if sufficiently broad, are often the first source of
revenue for domestic firms. The availability of patent protection for specific
categories of subject matter might be relevant for domestic innovators. Therefore, if
one accepts the premise that, at least in the pharmaceutical field, a state of
under-protection is as problematic as a state of over-protection, the legislative
proposal to ban any use claims—as enshrined in Bill No. 5402/13 and adopted
elsewhere—deserves further examination.310
This exclusion indeed does not
comprise only what some economists define as secondary patents. The exclusion
would, by contrast, prevent any legal protection for the first (medical or non-medical)
use of any known substance.311 It would avoid the granting of patents for completely
different uses from the applications of the known compound already established. 312
The rule would deny protection to a new medical indication for substances described
307 A fortiori, the Treaty permits the national legislator or case law to select which of the
unexpected properties might matter for patentability, as Section 3(d) of the IPA 2005 does with
respect to substances listed therein. See supra, Part III Paragraph B (4) of this article.
308 See Max Planck Inst. for Competition & Innovation, supra note 6, at 679 et seq.
309 This is the case, as long as legal protection remains available—at the request of the
applicant—within a “reasonable period of time.” Article 62(2) TRIPS. See supra, Part VI,
Paragraph B (2) of this article.
310 With respect to Indian law, see the observations by Mueller, supra note 87, at 491, 550 et seq.
311 For instance, if the patent application concerns pyrrolidine derivatives, which are already
described in a previous publication, but have never been described in prior art as being
pharmacodynamically active as therapeutic agents, their use would not be eligible for protection
under the Bill No. 5402/13, even if novel and inventive. The example for this first medical use of a
known compound is freely borrowed from T 128/82, Decision of 12 January 1984, OJ EPO 1984, 164
—Pyrrolidine-Derivatives/Hoffman-La Roche. See, on the first medical indication claim under the
EPC, RAINER MOUFANG, PATENTABILITY OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATIONS: THE EUROPEAN
PERSPECTIVE, IN PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION, COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW—A TRILATERAL
PERSPECTIVE 54, 66 et seq. (Josef Drexl & Nari Lee eds., 2013).
312 For instance, if the compound is described as a colorant in prior art, and a later inventor
discloses that it may be used as a lubricant, no protection would be allowed under the Bill
No. 5402/13. Again, if prior art describes the ability of the substance to lower blood pressure, and a
second inventor discloses that the same substance may be used to treat depressive disorders, the use
claim would not be admissible.
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as therapeutic agents in prior art, but for the treatment of a different illness. Some
of the inventions affected might constitute a medical or technical breakthrough. 313
Against this background, the Brazilian legislature may ponder whether an
intermediate solution is possible between the EPO approach, which admits a use
claim under Article 54 of the EPC—even if the only new feature is the patient
class,314 the dosage regimen,315 or the technical effect316—and the Indian approach.
This could consist of granting patents only for methods of use which differ in at least
one step from prior art. A mere “novelty of purpose”317 would not make the claimed
use patentable. In the medical field, this approach would include issuing patents only
for new indications—i.e., for using the compound in treating a disease which has not
previously been treated with that substance. 318
This approach would likely counter the proliferation of use patents for the same
class of compounds within the same indication. At the same time, it would allow
protection for relevant innovations, as the first medical use of a known substance or
the inventive repositioning of existing drugs. The latter field is of great medical
utility,319 and is one where not only established foreign originators, but also small
companies, start-ups, and newcomers may be highly competitive.320

313 In most of these cases, there are no qualitative differences between the inventor of a novel
compound and the inventor of a novel use, beyond the accidental existence or absence of a document
in prior art describing the chemical structure of the substance indicated in the patent claim—in a
way enabling its synthesis or production. This is why absolute product protection was under attack
in Europe in recent years, and was finally rejected by the ECJ in the field of gene sequences. See
the analysis of a leading authority in European Patent Law, KRAßER, supra note 129, at 139 et seq.
314 See T 0019/86, Decision of 15 October 1987, OJ EPO 1989, 24—DUPHAR/Pigs II.
315 G 2/08, Decision of 19 February 2010, OJ EPO 2010, 456—Dosage regime/ABBOTT
RESPIRATORY.
316 On this issue, see T 290/86, Decision of 13 November 1990, OJ EPO 1992, 414, 424, Reasons
for the Decision no. 6—Cleaning plaque/ICI; see also the case law examined by Moufang, supra note
311, at 61 et seq.
317 See GRUBB, supra note 148, at 249.
318 As a consequence, patent claims for the uses of the known substance for curing the same
illness as in prior art, where the novel feature is the method of administration, the dosage, the
patient class, or the mechanisms of action, were not admissible. For a similar approach proposed as
interpretation of Article 54 EPC 2000, see Dieter R. Schneider, Patenting of Pharmaceuticals—Still
a Challenge? INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 511, 523 (2008); Peter Meier-Beck,
Patentschutz für die zweite medizinische Indikation und ärztliche Therapiefreiheit, Gewerblicher
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht [GRUR] 300, 304 (2009).
319 See also Opinion of advocate general Trstenjak delivered on May 3, 2012 (1) Case C‑130/11
Neurim Pharmaceuticals (1991) Ltd v. Comptroller-General of Patents quoting KRAßER, supra note
129, at 249; see GRUBB, supra note 148, at 249.
320 See Richard B. Smith, Repositioned Drugs: Integrating Intellectual Property and Regulatory
Strategies, 8 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY: THERAPEUTIC STRATEGIES, 131, 201 (2011) (discussing drugs
repositioning and the reasons why in this field—because of the reduced risk and cost for the
development—start-ups and small companies can attract venture capital more easily).

